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Persecution Based on Political
Opinion: Interpretation of the
Refugee Act of 1980
The repression was an act of policy, decided upon by a group of men
who knew their original plans had gone awry.... It was necessary to
spread an atmosphere of terror. We have to create the impression of
mastery.
1
Since long before becoming an independent country, the United States
has been a place where a person could seek refuge. Over the years, mil-
lions have come to the U.S. to seek a better life. Some have immigrated
due to poor economic conditions in their home countries; others have
come to escape religious, ethnic, or political persecution. This Note
focuses on immigrants fleeing actual or feared persecution on account
of their political opinions or affiliations.
The Refugee Act of 1980 determines the rights of individuals seek-
ing to remain in the U.S. because of persecution based on their political
opinion. 2 Refugees who meet the statutory requirements cannot be
deported to the country from which they fear persecution, and they may
be eligible for political asylum. Unfortunately, U.S. courts and adminis-
trative agencies have not provided a consistent interpretation of the
phrase "persecution based on political opinion." No clear standard
defines the treatment that constitutes persecution, nor is there a test to
determine what qualifies as political opinion. The Supreme Court has
examined the burden of proof standard that must be met in order to
qualify under the Act, but has yet to attempt to define the phrase "perse-
cution based on political opinion." The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), the administrative body charged with determining the eligibility
1. HUGH THOMAS, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 258-260 (1977).
2. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(42), 1157-59, 1253(h), 1521-24 (1988)) (amending the Immigration and
Nationality Act, ch. 477, §§ 101(a), 207, 243(h), 66 Stat. 163, 166, 181, 214 (1952)
[hereinafter "INA"]).
3. The Court, however, granted certiorari in the case of Zacarias v. INS, 921
F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991). The Court did not
engage in a complete exploration of political persecution, for it limited argument to
the single question of whether forced participation in a guerrilla organization neces-
sarily constitutes persecution on account of the person's political opinions. For fuller
discussion of Zacarias, see infra notes 172-78, 306-26 and accompanying text. [The
case was decided as this issue went to press. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, No. 90-1342,
1992 WL 6768 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1992). Ed.]
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status of those seeking asylum, and the U.S. circuit courts of appeals
have been left on their own to interpret the Act.
Section I of this Note will describe the Refugee Act and the proce-
dures for gaining asylum based on political opinion. It will examine who
has the power, the courts or the BIA, to interpret the Refugee Act and
the degree of deference courts should give to administrative determina-
tions of fact and law. The Note will then consider current interpreta-
tions of "persecution based on political opinion," both by the BIA and
by circuit courts of appeals. Section II will examine the legislative his-
tory of the Refugee Act and the international documents and interpre-
tive sources upon which the Act was based. Finally, Section III will
propose solutions for some of the problems plaguing the BIA and the
courts.
This Note argues that Congress passed the Refugee Act to codify
the United States' obligations under the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees, 4 and that BIA and court interpretations of the Act do
not satisfy the United States' obligations under these treaties. In inter-
preting the Act, the courts and the BIA should, when possible, rely on
the U.N. Handbook on Criteria and Procedures for Determining Refugee Status
("U.N. Handbook"),5 a document promulgated by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and intended to guide
adjudicators in determining refugee status. Otherwise, the courts and
the BIA should rely on the broad purposes of the Refugee Act and on
the U.N. Convention and Protocol in general.
I. The Refugee Act of 1980
The Refugee Act governs asylum procedures and creates two avenues of
relief for an alien facing deportation. First, the Attorney General has
discretion to grant asylum if an alien is a "refugee" within the meaning
of section 1 101(a)(42) of Title 8 of the U.S. Code.6 The Act defines "ref-
ugee" as:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in
the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which
such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to
return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the
protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-
cution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
4. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, openedfor signature Jan. 31, 1967,
19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Protocol]. The Protocol was ratified
by the United States on October 4, 1968. 114 Cong. Rec. 29,607 (1968). It expressly
incorporates the terms of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened
for signature July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter
Convention].
5. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HAND-
BOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, U.N. Doc.
HCR/PRO/4 (1979) [hereinafter U.N. HANDBOOK].
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982).
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social group, or political opinion .... 7
The Act requires the Attorney General to establish procedures for aliens
in the U.S. to apply for asylum.8 If deportation proceedings have not
begun, an alien may apply for asylum from a District Director of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).9 If such proceedings
have begun, or if the District Director denied the alien's application for
asylum, the asylum application will be considered by the immigration
judge handling the deportation proceeding. 10 If a judge has already
ordered deportation, an alien can move to reopen proceedings to con-
sider a claim for asylum." Denials of asylum claims can be appealed to
the Board of Immigration Appeals 12 and subsequently to the circuit
court of appeals in either the circuit where the administrative proceed-
ings were conducted or in the circuit in which the alien was residing. 13
A successful applicant is eligible for permanent residence after one
year. 14
Under the second form of relief, withholding of deportation, if the
Attorney General concludes that a refugee's "life or freedom would be
threatened" in his home country, under section 243(h) of the Act, the
refugee cannot be deported to that country.' 5 If an alien meets this
requirement, the Attorney General has no discretion and must withhold
deportation.' 6 However, the alien will not necessarily be allowed to stay
in the U.S. The Attorney General may still deport the alien to a third
country willing to accept the alien.
7. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988) (emphasis added).
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). For an overview of the asylum process, see
THOMAS A. ALEINIKOFF & DAVID MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 615-
744 (1985); ARTHUR C. HELTON, MANUAL ON REPRESENTING ASYLUM APPLICANTS
(1984).
9. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, 208.3(a) (1990). See generally INA §§ 236, 242, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1226, 1252 (1988). Exclusion proceedings are applied against an alien seeking
admission to the U.S., while deportation proceedings are held to determine whether
an alien in the U.S. should be expelled.
10. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.1, 208.3(b), 208.9 (1990).
11. Id. § 208.11.
12. Id. §3.1(b).
13. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. 1105(a) (1988). BIA decisions are appealed to circuit
courts of appeals if related to final orders of deportation. All other orders relating to
exclusion and deportation proceedings can be reviewed through habeas corpus peti-
tions in federal district court. Id. § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(b) (1988).
14. Id. § 209(h), 8 U.S.C. 1159(b) (1988). Prior to obtaining permanent resi-
dence, an asylum grant may be revoked if the situation in the alien's home country
changes so that the alien no longer meets the definition in section 1 101(a)(42). Id. at
§ 208(b), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b) (1988).
15. Id. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. 1253(h) (1988). ("The Attorney General shall not
deport or return any alien ... to a country if the Attorney General determines that
such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such a country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion .... )
16. An application for withholding of deportation can be made only in exclusion
or deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1990). A decision on withholding
of deportation applications is made pursuant to the same provisions as an asylum
request. See supra notes 8-14 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the Attorney General has discretion under the Refugee Act to
grant asylum to refugees who have been persecuted or have a "well-
founded" fear of persecution on account of their political opinions and
cannot deport an alien to his home country if his "life or freedom would
be threatened" there.
For the first few years following the passage of the Refugee Act,
lower courts split concerning the burden of proof that an alien must
meet to be eligible for asylum or for withholding of deportation. In
1984, the Supreme Court in INS v. Stevic 17 settled the withholding of
deportation issue and determined that an alien must prove that "it is
more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution" if
deported to his home country in order to be entitled to withholding of
deportation under section 243(h). 18 The Court in Stevic, however, failed
to determine the burden of proof that an alien must satisfy to be eligible
for asylum, that is, how likely persecution must be for an alien's fear to
be "well-founded." 19
Finally in 1987 the Court, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,20 answered the
question left open in Stevic. It refused to apply the "more likely than
not" standard to an alien seeking asylum. 2 1 A petitioner for asylum
need only show that persecution is a "reasonable possibility." 2 2 The
Court was unwilling to give a more concrete definition to the phrase
"well-founded" and wrote that the term can "only be given concrete
meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication."'23 The Court
stated, however, that "[o]ne can certainly have a well-founded fear of an
event happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence
taking place."' 24 Cardoza-Fonseca also implied that a one in ten chance
would be sufficient to create a reasonable possibility. 25
After Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca, the probability of persecution
determines the required burden of proof in both asylum eligibility and
entitlement to withholding of deportation cases. Stevic requires an alien
to show that the probability of persecution is "more likely than not" to
be entitled to withholding of deportation. Cardoza-Fonseca holds that an
17. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
18. Id. at 429-430. The alien had argued that the well-founded fear standard in
section 208(a) of the Refugee Act also applied to applications for withholding of
deportation under Section 243(h). Id. at 428.
19. Compare Carcamo-Flores v. INS, 805 F.2d 60 (2nd Cir. 1986); Cardoza-Fon-
seca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985); and Carvajal-Mfinoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562,
574 (7th Cir. 1984) with Sankar v. INS, 757 F.2d 532, 533 (3rd Cir. 1985) (holding
that the two standards were identical).
20. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
21. Id. at 423. The Court stated that "Congress used different, broader language
to define the term 'refugee' as used in § 208(a) than it used to describe the class of
aliens who have a right to withholding of deportation under § 243(h)." Id. at 423-24.
22. Id. at 440. ("[Sbo long as an objective situation is established by the evidence,
it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is
enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.") (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 448.
24. Id. at 43 1.
25. Id. at 440.
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alien need only show a reasonable possibility of persecution to meet the
requirement of a "well-founded" fear necessary for asylum eligibility.
Thus, if an alien can show sufficient probability of persecution to war-
rant withholding of deportation, he or she is also eligible for asylum.
Conversely, if an alien cannot prove he or she is eligible for asylum, he
or she will never be able to satisfy the requirements of withholding of
deportation.
The Court has stated that one reason for placing a higher burden of
proof on refugees seeking withholding of deportation is the mandatory
nature of the relief.26 The reasonable possibility standard in asylum eli-
gibility cases is sufficient because the Attorney General has discretion to
reject an alien's petition for asylum even if he or she meets the statutory
criteria.
The Attorney General has delegated to the BIA the authority to
determine whether an alien meets the standards for one or both forms
of relief.27 Whether an alien meets the statutory requirements for one
or both forms of relief is first a question of fact. Once the facts are
determined, the BIA must determine whether the alien's situation falls
within the scope of the Act.
The BIA and the circuit courts often have widely different views on
the meaning of the Refugee Act.28 If the BIA and a circuit court disa-
gree, the circuit court's interpretation controls within the circuit's juris-
diction. But the BIA may, and often does, maintain its interpretations in
cases arising in other circuits. Some circuits have granted broad defer-
ence to the BIA's findings of fact and interpretations of the Refugee Act.
Other circuits have deferred to the BIA only on questions of fact and
have reviewed questions of law de novo. One circuit even scrutinizes fac-
tual determinations. The proper level of deference shown to the BIA by
the circuit courts is important because the more deferential the circuit
courts are, the more powerful the BIA (and through it, the current polit-
ical administration) becomes in terms of guiding U.S. refugee policy. 29
A. Deference to BIA Findings and Interpretations
1. Factual Findings
The Supreme Court has stated that courts must review factual findings
of an administrative agency under a substantial evidence test.3 0 Agency
findings of fact are not to be overturned if there is substantial evidence
in the record to support the agency's decision. 3 1 Most circuit courts
have used this substantial evidence test to review BIA determinations of
26. Id. at 439, 449-50.
27. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(a) (1990).
28. See infra notes 48-181 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 245-65 and accompanying text for full discussion.
30. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
31. Id. at490.
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fact.3 2 The Ninth Circuit in Diaz-Escobar v. INS,33 stated that "we may
not reverse the BIA simply because we disagree with its evaluation of the
facts, but only if we conclude that the BIA evaluation is not supported by
substantial evidence." 3 4 Moreover, the court held that "[a]ll the sub-
stantial evidence standard requires is that the BIA's conclusion, based
on the evidence presented, be substantially reasonable." 3 5
Although all the circuits agree on the standard, their applications of
the standard differ. The First Circuit uses a "deferential" substantial
evidence test,3 6 while the Sixth Circuit refers to the test as a "clearly
erroneous" standard.3 7 While it is unclear whether a deferential sub-
stantial evidence test and a dearly erroneous test differ, it appears that
the First and Sixth Circuits use a more deferential test that the Ninth
Circuit, at least where the BIA or immigration judge finds an alien's tes-
timony not credible. The Ninth Circuit has held that an immigration
judge "who rejects testimony for lack of credibility must offer a 'specific,
cogent' reason for the rejection." 3 8 The court will then evaluate
whether the reasons are "valid grounds" for finding the alien not credi-
ble.39 The Ninth Circuit has also held that "the IJ [Immigration Judge]
must not only articulate the basis for a negative credibility finding, but
those reasons must be substantial and must bear a legitimate nexus to
the finding." '40
2. Legal Conclusions
In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,4 1 the Supreme Court
announced the basic standard governing the deference circuit courts
must give to the legal interpretations of administrative agencies. In
Chevron, Justice Stevens articulated a two-prong inquiry:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction of the statute
* .. [I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
32. See, e.g., Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990); Arteaga v. INS,
836 F.2d 1227, 1228 (9th Cir. 1988).
33. 782 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1986).
34. Id. at 1493.
35. Id. See also Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1987). The substantial
evidence test requires review of the whole record. "Substantial evidence is more than
a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 1398.
36. Alvarez-Flores, 909 F.2d at 3.
37. Doe v. INS, 867 F.2d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1989).
38. Vilorio-Lopez v. INS, 852 F.2d 1137, 1141 (9th Cir. 1988).
39. Id. at 1142.
40. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1381 (9th Cir. 1990).
41. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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on a permissible construction of the statute.4 2
Courts will use traditional methods of statutory interpretation 43 to
decide whether Congress expressed a clear intent or whether the statute
in question is ambiguous. If the court decides that Congress had a clear
intent, that intent will be given effect. 44 If Congress' intent is not dear,
circuit courts must defer to an agency's interpretation if it is reasonable.
Three years after Chevron, in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Cardoza-Fonseca,4 5 the Supreme Court examined both the Refugee Act
and the proper level of deference for the BIA's interpretation of the law.
The Court rejected the BIA's interpretation of the Act and concluded
that Congress' intent on this issue could be determined both through
traditional methods of statutory construction, and by examining the leg-
islative history behind the Refugee Act.4 6 The Court, however, said that
some of the terms in the Refugee Act are ambiguous. Ambiguities can
only be resolved through case-by-case adjudication, and courts must
respect the administrative agency's interpretation. 4 7
At the appellate level, courts have disagreed over whether certain
aspects of the Refugee Act are ambiguous or devoid of Congressional
intent or whether Congress' intent can be divined through ordinary stat-
utory construction methods. Where the Act is ambiguous or Congress
had no intent, courts have differed over whether the BIA's interpreta-
tion is reasonable.
There is also wide division among the circuit courts regarding def-
erence to the BIA's interpretations of the Refugee Act. The Ninth Cir-
cuit has clearly indicated that it will review questions of law de novo. 4 8
The Ninth Circuit finds support for its position in the Supreme Court's
statement in Cardoza-Fonseca that "[t]he judiciary is the final authority on
issues of statutory construction . . . . 49 The Ninth Circuit appears to
believe that the courts can ascertain Congress's intent in most applica-
42. Id. at 842-43.
43. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). The Court cites the plain
language doctrine and the use of legislative history as two of the ordinary canons of
statutory construction. Id. at 449. If the plain language appears to settle the ques-
tion, then the legislative history should be examined only for a clear contrary intent
that would rebut the strong presumption that Congress "expresses its intent through
the language it chooses." Id. at 432 n.12.
44. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9:
The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and
must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congres-
sional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,
ascertains that Congress has an intention on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect.
45. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
46. Id. at 446.
47. Id. at 448.
48. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 721 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed,
No. 90-1-246, 59 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1991); Maldonado-Cruz v. INS, 883
F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989); Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1228 (9th Cir. 1988);
Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1988).
49. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 447-48 (citing Chevron).
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tions of the Refugee Act by using ordinary statutory construction meth-
ods and by examining the relevant legislative history.
The First, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, which also rely on Cardoza-
Fonseca for support, have come to opposite conclusions. They agree that
questions of law must be reviewed de novo, but argue that where Con-
gress uses ambiguous terms, such as "well-founded," the courts should
defer to reasonable agency interpretations. 50 These circuits have con-
cluded that Congress was ambiguous or expressed no intent towards
specific applications of the Refugee Act. Thus, deference to the BIA is
appropriate.
The remainder of this section will examine the various interpreta-
tions of the Refugee Act and, in particular, the words "persecution" and
"political opinion."
B. Persecution
1. BIA Approach
The Board of Immigration Appeals has taken a hard-line position on
granting asylum and withholding of deportation. An alien must satisfy a
high standard in order to show a well-founded fear or clear probability
of persecution. Most BIA cases look only at whether an alien meets the
less onerous "well-founded" fear test for asylum eligibility, for if the
BIA concludes that the test is not met, there is no need to analyze a
claim for withholding of deportation, which requires a higher burden of
proof. Thus, except where noted otherwise, the following material
relates to claims of asylum eligibility.
To be eligible for asylum, an alien must first show that the harm he
or she fears is persecution. Next, the alien must show either past perse-
cution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The BIA includes
both objective and subjective components in its well-founded fear test. 51
To meet the subjective component, the alien's fear must be genuine. 52
The BIA has held that the objective component is essentially a reason-
able person test. A well-founded fear is established if a reasonable per-
son in the alien's circumstances would fear persecution. 53 To meet the
objective component, it must also be shown that:
50. See Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990); Perlera-Escobar v.
Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 1990); Campos-
Guardado v. INS, 809 F.2d. 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1987).
51. In re Mogharrabi, Interim Decision No. 3028, at 8 (BIA 1987).
52. Id.
53. Id. See also Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518 (4th Cir. 1986). The Court
here quoted the Board:
[T]he 'well-founded fear' test requires the alien to establish that he has a
subjective fear of returning and that his fear has enough of a basis in specific
facts to be considered 'well-founded' upon objective evaluation. The alien
must offer 'specific facts' detailing a 'good reason' to fear persecution, or
establishing an objectively reasonable 'expectation of persecution.'
Id. at 1522.
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(1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to
overcome in others by means of punishment of some sort;
(2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that
the alien possesses this characteristic;
(3) the persecutor has the capability to punish the alien; and
(4) the persecutor has the inclination to punish that alien. 54
Under the BIA test, harm caused by general upheaval, strife, civil
wars or random widespread violence does not meet this test even if the
alien has good reason to fear he or she will suffer some harm. Harm of
this type is not persecution because there is no belief or characteristic
that a persecutor seeks to overcome. The BIA has held that an alien
must show specific threats directed at the alien personally and that
"political upheaval" affecting "the populace as a whole" is not persecu-
tion. 55 Even specific threats to an alien are not always sufficient if there
is widespread violence in the alien's home country.5 6
It is unclear from the BIA's opinions whether an alien must provide
independent corroborating evidence, in addition to his or her own testi-
mony, to be eligible for asylum or entitled to withholding of deporta-
tion. In some cases the BIA has held that an alien's fear of persecution
must have "its basis in external, or objective, facts" and that an alien's
uncorroborated statements will not be sufficient to meet the alien's bur-
den of proof.5 7 In other cases, at least where an alien is applying for
asylum and thus must meet a lesser standard of a "reasonable possibil-
ity" of persecution, the BIA has held that corroborating evidence may
not be needed.5 8
Even though it is apparently accepted that corroborating evidence
is not always required, an alien's personal testimony will rarely suffice,
unless he or she is from a country which the U.S. recognizes as perse-
cuting its citizens. If an alien is from a Communist country, a country
occupied by Communist forces (such as Afghanistan before Soviet with-
drawal), or from a country opposed to the U.S., such as Iran, an alien's
personal testimony may be sufficient. 59 Other cases suggest that where
54. In re Mogharrabi at 11.
55. In re Martinez-Romero, Interim Decision No. 2872 (BIA 1981).
56. Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1284 (9th Cir. 1984). ("IT]he
Board concluded that the specific threat against Bolanos' life was merely 'representa-
tive of the general conditions in El Salvador.' ").
57. In re Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986, at 21 (BIA 1985). (The Board
equated the burden of proof for withholding of deportation that for asylum, holding
that the standard for both was a clear probability of persecution). See also Turcios v.
INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The INS contends that Turcios's applica-
tion is insufficient because he failed to introduce corroborative evidence."); Doe v.
INS, 867 F.2d 285, 290 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[Flear was not well-founded because the
respondent has relied on his own uncorroborated statements.").
58. In re Mogharrabi at 10. (Lack of corroborating evidence is not necessarily
fatal to an alien's claim).
59. Id. In granting asylum to an alien from Iran, the BIA stated:
Where the country at issue in an asylum case has a history of persecuting
people in circumstances similar to the asylum applicant's, careful considera-
tion should be given to that fact in assessing the applicant's claim. A well-
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an alien is from a country whose government is friendly to the U.S. 6 0 or
which the U.S. does not wish to embarrass, 61 independent evidence may
be required. This suggests that the Board will require more evidence
from an alien who is from a country not normally associated with perse-
cution or a country that the U.S. government does not wish to brand as a
human rights violator.
The BIA also takes a hard-line approach in its treatment of such
factors as a government's awareness of the political opinions held by the
alien, the ability of the alien to remain in the country of persecution
after initial incidents of persecution, the holding of a passport by an
alien, and threats to an alien's family. Although in one case, the BIA
indicated that an alien could prove a well-founded fear by showing that
his or her government knew or could become aware of the political
opinions held by the alien, 62 the BIA has cited as a negative factor the
fact that an alien's government is unaware of the political opinions held
by the alien.6 3 If the alien has been able to obtain a passport from his or
her government, the BIA will not view this favorably. 64 The same is true
if the alien remained in his or her country unharmed after an initial inci-
dent of persecution.65 Finally, attacks on a member of an alien's family
will not necessarily persuade the BIA that an alien has a well-founded
fear, as the fear is not based on specific, individualized threats. 6 6
2. Judicial Approach
Despite the lack of Supreme Court guidance, the circuit courts have
agreed on a general definition of the word "persecution." The Ninth
founded fear, in other words, can be based on what has happened to others
who are similarly situated.
Id. at 10-11.
60. See In re Dass, Interim Decision No. 3122, at 7 (BIA 1989). (Background infor-
mation may be necessary to evaluate the "plausibility and accuracy of the applicant's
claim" where the alien was from India).
61. See In re Chang, Interim Decision No. 3107, at 12 (BIA 1989) (Personal testi-
mony of Chinese alien was not enough to "provide a plausible and coherent account
of the basis of his asylum claim.").
62. In re Mogharrabi at 11.
63. See Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985). The court affirmed
the Board's denial of withholding of deportation because Garcia failed to show that
he was harassed, arrested, or that the government was aware of his political activities.
Id. at 1373.
64. Turcios, 821 F.2d at 1401-02 ("[T]he [Immigration Judge] placed great weight
on Turcios' . . . obtaining a passport and cedula (apparently an identification card
held by all Salvadorans), and leaving the country. The IJ reasoned that if the govern-
ment had wanted to rearrest Turcios, it would not have issued him a passport and
cedula.").
65. See Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert.
filed, No. 90-1223, 59 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S.Jan. 31, 1991) (The INS argued that the
government had an opportunity to persecute the applicant in the two and a half years
between the first incident of persecution and departure date and did not and, there-
fore, the applicant's fear must not be reasonable); Turcios, 821 F.2d at 1401 (J placed
great weight on Turcios remaining in El Salvador for several months after his release
from prison).
66. Ramirez-Rivas, 899 F.2d at 872.
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Circuit articulated the prevailing view in Desir v. I/chert:67
The statutory term "persecution" or "well founded fear of persecution"
has been defined in this Circuit as encompassing more than just restric-
tions or threats to life and liberty. Most simply, we have stated that perse-
cution involves "the infliction of suffering or harm upon those who differ
(in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as offensive."
Persecution is found "only when there is a difference between the perse-
cutor's views or status and that of the victim; it is oppression which is
inflicted on groups or individuals because of a difference that the persecu-
tor will not tolerate." 68
Applying this definition, however, has proved problematic. Like the
BIA, the circuit courts rarely find it necessary to analyze both asylum
and withholding of deportation claims. The courts, with few exceptions,
find either (a) that an alien has not shown a well-founded fear of perse-
cution and thus, afortiori, is not entitled to withholding of deportation,
or (b) that the alien has met the requirement that persecution be more
likely than not, and thus he or she becomes entitled to withholding of
deportation and eligible for asylum. Except where noted, in cases cited
in this Section, courts are addressing claims of asylum eligibility and,
consequently, the well-founded fear test.
The Refugee Act states that to qualify as a refugee one must show
past persecution or a "well-founded fear of [future] persecution."'6 9
While determining whether conduct qualifies as persecution is often dif-
ficult, an alien who can show past persecution is clearly eligible for con-
sideration for asylum and entitled to withholding of deportation. 70 The
courts have had more trouble interpreting the phrase "well-founded
fear of persecution." The alien must show both that his fear is well-
founded and that what he fears qualifies as persecution.7 1 Courts gener-
ally agree with the BIA that there are subjective and objective compo-
nents to "well-founded. ' 72 The subjective part of the test is satisfied by
showing that the fear is genuine. 73 The objective component resembles
a reasonable person test. The alien must show that a reasonable person
in his or her position would fear persecution.74 The alien's fear "must
have some basis in the reality of the circumstances; mere irrational
67. 840 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1988).
68. Id. at 726-27 (citations omitted).
69. INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988).
70. Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[E]vidence
establishing past persecution ... is usually sufficient to satisfy the objective compo-
nent of the well-founded fear standard.").
71. See Desir, 840 F.2d at 729.
72. Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1990); M.A. A26851062 v. INS,
899 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[The term 'well-founded fear' requires an exam-
ination both of the subjective feelings of the applicant for asylum and the objective
reasons for the applicant's fear."); De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1990).
73. De Valle, 901 F.2d at 790; Alvarez-Flores, 909 F.2d at 5.
74. M.A. A26851062, 899 F.2d at 311; Guevara-Flores v. INS, 786 F.2d 1242,
1249 (5th Cir. 1986).
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apprehension is insufficient .... -75 In addition, the alien bears the
burden of showing that his or her fear of persecution is well-founded. 76
The circuits disagree over how much evidence is needed to prove
persecution and whether the alien must provide objective evidence in
addition to his or her own testimony. The circuits also disagree as to
whether perceived threats must be specifically directed at the individual,
whether an alien can show the requisite probability of persecution if the
potential persecutor is unaware of the alien's political views, and as to
the relevance of threats to the alien's family or the possession of a pass-
port by an alien.
a. Specificity of Threats
Most circuits agree that an alien must face threats directed specifically at
him or her as an individual. 77 An alien must show specific objective
facts 78 and cannot rely on "speculative conclusions or vague asser-
tions." 79 Therefore, evidence of anarchy,8 0 upheaval,8 ' and poor eco-
nomic conditions8 2 will not support a finding of a well-founded fear of
persecution.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit has not required that threats be
directed at the individual seeking asylum. In MA. A26851062 v. INS,
the court interpreted the Refugee Act to require an applicant to produce
facts supporting a well-founded fear, but not necessarily facts demon-
strating that the applicant was singled out or specifically threatened.8 3
This may suggest that an alien would be able to show a well-founded
75. Guevara-Flores, 786 F.2d at 1249.
76. See Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1539 (9th Cir. 1985).
77. Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406,411 (6th Cir. 1987) (alien must show that "he as
an individual will be subject to persecution") (quoting Dolores v. INS, 772 F.2d 223,
225 (6th Cir. 1985)); Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1985)
(Alien must "introduce some specific evidence to show that such persecution, if car-
ried out, would be directed toward him as an individual."); Carvajal-Mufioz v. INS,
743 F.2d 562, 573 (7th Cir. 1984) (Alien must offer specific facts "that this particular
applicant will more likely than not be singled out for persecution."); Chavarria v.
Department ofJustice, 722 F.2d 666, 670 (11 th Cir. 1984).
78. De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1990) (Alien "must show 'spe-
cific' facts through objective evidence.") (citations omitted); Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802
F.2d 1518, 1521 (4th Cir. 1986).
79. Kaveh-Haghigy v. INS, 783 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Maroufi
v. INS, 772 F.2d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 1985)).
80. Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that if
anarchy sufficed to entitle the alien to withholding of deportation, then the entire
population of El Salvador could remain in the U.S. if they were to enter).
81. Subramaniam v. INS Dist. Dir., 724 F. Supp 799, 802 (D.Colo. 1989) ("Gen-
eralized conditions of dislocation, such as might be caused by famine, earthquake or
war, do not entitle a person to refugee status.").
82. See Youssefinia v. INS, 784 F.2d 1254, 1261 (5th Cir. 1986); Raass v. INS, 692
F.2d 596, 596 (9th Cir. 1982).
83. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 1990) (An alien must
show that his or her fear has "enough basis in specific facts to be considered 'well-
founded' upon objective evaluation. The alien must offer 'specific facts' detailing a
Igood reason' to fear persecution.") (citations omitted).
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fear by providing evidence that members of his or her family, group, or
people holding similar political opinions have been persecuted.
Courts have differed widely on the weight to accord evidence con-
cerning a country's general level of violence or evidence of widespread
human rights abuses. The general rule states that "[a]llegations based
only on the general climate of violence in the country are insufficient"8 4
and that an applicant must show individual, specific hardships rather
than the difficulties of an entire nation.8 5 Despite this general state-
ment, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have taken a liberal approach, holding
that general conditions in a country are relevant in determining whether
fear is well-founded. 8 6 It would appear that in these circuits, if an alien
can show that there is a high level of violence in his or her home coun-
try, he or she may be able to support a claim of a well-founded fear with
less specific facts of individual harassment than would otherwise be
necessary.
The Fourth Circuit has taken the opposite approach. In C-az-Lopez
v. INS, 8 7 the petitioner, Marvin Cruz-Lopez, an immigrant from El Sal-
vador, offered evidence of the general level of violence and chaos in his
country to show that he would face persecution if deported.88 The court
not only rejected the evidence as insufficient, but also suggested that in
a country where violence is widespread, even a specific threat may not
be enough to show a well-founded fear. Evidently, the court felt that the
greater the general level of violence, the more likely a threat was a ran-
dom occurrence and not targeted at the individual specifically. 89 In the
Fourth Circuit it may be necessary, therefore, to show additional inci-
dents of individualized threats when there is a high level of violence in a
country.
b. Corroborating Testimony
Must an alien substantiate claims of fear of persecution with independ-
ent corroborating evidence or testimony? Most circuits say yes, holding
that because personal testimony is self-serving, it will not be sufficient to
prove a well-founded fear of persecution.9 0 Nevertheless, the Ninth Cir-
84. Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1521 (4th Cir. 1986).
85. See Kaveh-Haghigy v. INS, 783 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Gir. 1986).
86. Barraza Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1448 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[G]eneral infor-
mation concerning oppressive conditions is relevant to support specific information
relating to an individual's well-founded fear of persecution.") (quoting Zavala-
Bonilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 564 (9th Cir. 1984)); Ganjour v. INS, 796 F.2d 832, 837
(5th Cir. 1986); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1283 n. 11 (9th Cir.
1984) ("conditions in the [alien's] country of origin, its laws, and the experiences of
others.. ." are relevant) (quoting Stevic v. Sava, 678 F.2d 401, 406 (2nd Cir. 1982)).
87. 802 F.2d 1518 (4th Cir. 1986).
88. Id. at 1519-20.
89. Id. at 1521.
90. See Gumbol v. INS, 815 F.2d 406, 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding peti-
tioner's personal testimony alone insufficient to show a clear probability of future
persecution); Farzad v. INS, 802 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (peti-
tioner's own testimony insufficient without external evidence). See also Mendoza-
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cuit has held that corroborating evidence is not required if the alien's
testimony is credible, at least when an alien seeks asylum. 9 1 The court
in Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS 9 2 recognized that evidence supporting perse-
cution is often difficult or impossible to obtain:
[T]he imposition of such a requirement would result in the deportation of
many people whose lives genuinely are in jeopardy. Authentic refugees
rarely are able to offer direct corroboration of specific threats. '[I]t is dif-
ficult to imagine what other forms of testimony the petitioner[s] could
present other than [their] own statement[s].' Persecutors are hardly likely
to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of
persecution.9 3
c. Awareness of Political Opinions Held
A third issue that has divided appellate courts is whether an alien must
show that the persecutor is aware of his or her political activities or opin-
ions. Some circuits have held that it is sufficient to show that a govern-
ment or other group would persecute an individual if it were aware of
his or her political activity or political opinions. The U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado in Subramaniam v. District Director, INS,9 4
cited the BIA's four-part test as a "workable explication" of the "well-
founded" standard. The first two prongs state that an alien meets the
objective component of the test if:
1) the alien possesses a belief or characteristic a persecutor seeks to over-
come in others by means of punishment of some sort [, and];
2) the persecutor is already aware, or could easily become aware, that the
alien possesses this characteristic. 95
The First Circuit in Alvarez-Flores v. INS,96 citing the same language
as Subramaniam, held that it would be sufficient for an applicant to show
that the persecutor could become aware of the alien's beliefs. 9 7
Other circuits hold this to be insufficient. The Fifth Circuit suggests
that even extensive political activity opposing the government is insuffi-
cient to prove a well-founded fear when the government is not yet aware
Perez v. INS, 902 F.2d 760, 766 (9th Cir. 1990) (Sneed, J., concurring) ("Such evi-
dence [an alien's own testimony] is highly subjective, and being filtered through the
lens of the alien's experience, it may be distorted. Accordingly, every circuit but this
one [the Ninth Circuit] has required external corroborating evidence.").
91. Barraza-Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1449 (9th Cir. 1990) ("An alien's credi-
ble and persuasive testimony, standing alone, may establish eligibility for political
asylum and withholding of deportation."); Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027,
1030 (9th Cir. 1990) ("Once credibility has been accorded to Beltran's testimony,
corroborative evidence is not required.").
92. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
93. Id. at 1285 (quoting McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981).
94. 724 F. Supp. 799 (D.Colo. 1989).
95. Id. at 801. (quoting In re Mogharrabi, Interim Decision No. 3028, at 11 (BIA
1987)) (emphasis added).
96. 909 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
97. Id. at 4.
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of the alien's activities or beliefs. 98
The Ninth Circuit has offered one solution to this dilemma by hold-
ing that without proof that the potential persecutor is aware of his or her
activities or beliefs, an alien cannot show a clear probability of persecu-
tion necessary for withholding of deportation, but may still be able to
show a reasonable possibility of persecution necessary to be eligible for
asylum. In Garcta-Ramos v INS,99 the applicant Garcia, a native of El Sal-
vador, claimed that he was a member of the Frente Popular de Libera-
ci6n (the Popular Front for Liberation or "FPL"), a "leftist political
group opposed to the government." He further claimed to have partici-
pated in numerous activities opposed to the government, such as dis-
seminating propaganda, painting slogans, and stealing food to
distribute to the poor. 0 0 Nevertheless, he could not show that the gov-
ernment was aware of his activities. The court held that while "Garcia's
evidence does not rise to the degree of probability of persecution we
have held to be sufficient for section 243(h) relief [withholding of depor-
tation]," 10' the possibility that the government might learn of his activi-
ties or membership in FPL was sufficient to establish a reasonable
possibility of persecution, the standard for asylum eligibility. 10 2
d. Persecution by Unknown Groups
Courts generally agree that persecution does not necessarily have to
come from the government in order to create a well-founded fear. The
Ninth Circuit, in Zacarias v. INS, 10 3 stated the general view that persecu-
tion can come from any "entity which the government is 'unwilling or
unable to control.' "104 This entity could be renegade elements of the
government10 5 or guerrilla-type groups.106
The courts take different approaches, however, when an alien can-
not determine the source of the feared persecution. In Maldonado-Cruz
v. Department of Immigration and Naturalization,10 7 the Ninth Circuit held
that a "clear probability that an alien's life or freedom is threatened,
without any indication of the basis for the threat, is generally insufficient
98. See Bahramnia v. INS, 782 F.2d 1243, 1248 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479
U.S. 930 (1986).
99. 775 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1985).
100. Id. at 1372.
101. Id. at 1373.
102. Id. at 1374.
103. 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 2008 (1991).
104. Id. at 849 (quoting McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312, 1315 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981)).
105. See Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1990) (alien was
found eligible for asylum where he feared persecution from uncontrollable Salvado-
ran death squads); Lazo-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir. 1987).
106. See Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 844, 849 (persecution need not come from the gov-
ernment and may be from a nongovernmental guerrilla group); Maldonado-Cruz v.
Department of Immigration & Naturalization, 883 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1989);
Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1284 (9th Cir. 1984).
107. 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
Cornell International Law Journal
to constitute 'persecution.' "108 The same circuit came to the opposite
conclusion a year later in Aguilera-Cota v. INS.' 0 9 The court stated that:
Aguilera's inability to identify the precise source of the threat [does not]
render his fear of persecution less justifiable; in fact, an anonymous note
may cause even greater anxiety than a signed one, since the case of an
anonymous threat one cannot identify the potential source of harm... 110
As in the case of an alien's political activities or opinions, the differ-
ent results could be a function of the type of relief that the alien seeks.
In Maldonaldo-Cruz, the alien sought withholding of deportation whereas
in Aguilera-Cota, the alien sought asylum. It is possible that the court was
distinguishing the two cases and saying that failure to identify the source
of persecution is fatal to a claim for withholding of deportation, but not
to a claim of asylum eligibility.
e. Other Miscellaneous Factors
The circuits have disagreed on three additional factors: (1) possession
of a passport by an alien; (2) time spent in the country of persecution
once initial persecution has occurred; and (3) threats to one's family.
Some courts have suggested that an alien's ability to obtain a pass-
port or exit visa shows that the government does not wish to persecute
him or her.1'1 The Ninth Circuit in Turcios v. INS,"12 however, held that
a government may wish simply to eliminate political opposition either by
persecution or by allowing dissidents to leave. 13 Judge Pregerson, in a
dissenting opinion in Saballo-Cortez v INS, 1 4 observed that "to say that
the authorities let Saballo-Cortez leave is a far cry from concluding that
they would welcome his return. '"1 5
The fact that an alien continued to live in his or her home country
after initial incidents of persecution is often cited as evidence that his or
her fear is not well-founded. 116 The Ninth Circuit, however, has recog-
108. Id. at 791.
109. 914 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990).
110. Id. at 1380.
111. See Espinoza-Martinez v. INS, 754 F.2d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[I]t
seems that Espinoza acquired a Nicaraguan passport without difficulty, in order to
leave the country, a fact which also cuts against petitioner's argument that he will be
individually persecuted upon return."); Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 749 F.2d 1354, 1359
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding it proper to infer from issuance of passport that petitioner
was not subject to persecution); see also Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
1990); Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1990).
112. 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1987).
113. Id. at 1402. See also Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1374 n. 7 (9th Cir.
1985) ("[W]e doubt whether such evidence should be entitled to much weight in any
asylum case. If a government considered an individual to be a troublemaker, it might
actually prefer to have him leave the country. The Cuban 'Freedom Flotila' [sic] is an
illustration.").
114. Saballo-Cortez, 749 F.2d at 1361 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 1365.
116. See Chavarria v. Department of Justice, 722 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1984) The
petitioner was an employee at a company which fell into disfavor with the Nicaraguan
government. The court held that Chavarria could not show a clear probability of
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nized that an alien may be able to remain in his or her home country
without further problems but may still have good reasons to fear perse-
cution. A period of unmolested residence alone should not defeat an
alien's claim. 117 In Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, the court held that:
[E]vidence of a short period without persecution is relevant but not suffi-
cient to undermine an otherwise strong case. Even refugees in the clear-
est danger of persecution may be able to avoid the authorities for some
time before they leave the country. The Immigration Act should not be
read to require that a refugee's persecutors be in hot pursuit of him as he
flees the country. 1 18
Courts have seemed quite willing to extend protection to aliens who
can show that members of their families have been subjected to persecu-
tion.1 19 Protection has been extended even where the alien has not
shown that threats were directed at him or her personally, possibly cre-
ating an exception to the requirement that an alien show specific indi-
vidual threats. 120 However, courts may use a lack of threats to one's
family as evidence that the alien's fear of persecution is not well-
founded. For example, the Ninth Circuit stated in Rodriguez-Rivera v.
INS 121 that the fact that an alien's family in El Salvador suffered no har-
assment after the alien had fled the country undercut his claim of a well-
founded fear of persecution. 12 2
If an alien can show that he or she would face persecution, he or she
has satisfied only the first step. Regardless of the level of persecution,
the alien must show that the persecution is because of his or her political
opinions.
C. Political Opinion
1. BIA Approach
In addition to the hard-line approach taken by the BIA with respect to
proving persecution, the BIA has limited the types of persecution or
persecution since he was able to remain in Nicaragua for two years after the events
occurred "which allegedly triggered the persecution of company employees." Id. at
670. See also Alvarez-Flores, 909 F.2d at 5; Novoa-Umania, 896 F.2d at 3.
117. See Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert.
filed, No. 90-1223, 59 U.S.L.W. 3535 (U.S.Jan. 31, 1991) ("The fact that Ms. Ramirez
remained unharmed for a few months while she prepared to leave the country has
only marginal probative value."). See also Damaize-Job v. INS, 787 F.2d 1332 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that the fact that petitioner remained in the country for two years
without harm prior to fleeing was not dispositive).
118. Ramirez-Rivas, 899 F.2d at 871.
119. See id. at 872-73 (extending eligibility for asylum to a young woman who
showed only that members of her family had been persecuted but that she herself had
not been persecuted); Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1985)
("The fact that there have been a number of threats or acts of violence against mem-
bers of an alien's family is sufficient to support the conclusion that the alien's life or
freedom is endangered.").
120. Ramirez-Rivas, 899 F.2d at 872-73.
121. 848 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 1006. See also Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir.
1985).
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harm that will qualify as persecution based on political opinion. This
limitation revolves around four main issues: (1) whether neutrality qual-
ifies as an expression of political opinion; (2) whether persecution for a
trait or belief not held by the alien is persecution based on political
opinion; (3) whether conscription by government and non-government
groups constitutes persecution, and (4) whether prosecution can qualify
as persecution based on political opinion.
a. Political Neutrality
The BIA looks unfavorably on assertions that political neutrality falls
within the statutory definition of persecution based on political opinion.
In most cases, the BIA has flatly held that a request for political asylum
cannot be predicated on an alien's claim of neutrality.' 2 3 However, in a
circuit that has conditionally or explicitly accepted political neutrality as
an expression of political opinion, 12 4 the BIA has modified its approach.
In these cases, it has assumed that neutrality may qualify as a political
opinion, but has required the alien to show "that he has articulated and
affirmatively made a decision to remain neutral, and that he has received
a threat or could be singled out for persecution because of his neutrality
opinion."1 25
b. Imputed Political Opinion
The BIA is also hesitant to recognize the doctrine of imputed opinion.
The BIA has held that an alien does not have a well-founded fear of
persecution based on political opinion if he or she holds no opinion, or
holds an opinion different from that attributed to him or her, even when
the persecutor believes that the alien holds such an opinion and perse-
cutes the alien for that reason. 12 6 In Turcios v. INS, 1 2 7 Turcios was
123. See Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Imm., 894 F.2d 1292, 1298 (11 th
Cir. 1990) ("[T]he BIA has declined to apply the principle that a desire to remain
neutral is an expression of a political opinion for purposes of asylum and withholding
of deportation.") (citing In re Maldonado-Cruz, Interim Decision No. 3041, at 11
(BIA 1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989)); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767
F.2d 1277, 1286 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The government contends the Bolanos' decision
to remain politically neutral is not a political choice.").
124. See In re Virgil, Interim Decision No. 3050 (BIA 1988).
If the holding in Bolanos-Hernandez could be read to require a finding that the
respondent here, who apparently has only expressed his 'neutrality' opinion
during his deportation hearing in this country, has established eligibility for
asylum, then we would certainly restrict the applicability of Bolanos-Hernandez
to cases arising in the Ninth Circuit.
Id. at 6-7.
125. Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1990) (quoting the BIA).
See also Novoa-Umania v. INS, 896 F.2d 1, 3 (Ist Cir. 1990) (stating that the court
shared the Board's assumption that neutrality may qualify as political opinion in
"appropriate circumstances").
126. See Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1990). The petitioner was
threatened based on "his employment and presumed support of the government,"
even though he had expressed no opinion. The court held that "the BIA and IJ
failed to recognize that Aguilera fell within the definition of refugee because of his
imputed 'political opinion.'" Id. at 1379.
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arrested after talking to a known leftist professor and suspected guer-
rilla. The BIA found that even if Turcios's testimony was credible, he
was not persecuted because of his political opinion. "The INS contends
that Turcios's arrest, torture, and confinement were not based upon a
political opinion because .. .Turcios disclaimed any involvement in
politics or guerrilla insurgency."1 28
c. Conscription
The BIA has consistently held that a government has the right to require
military service of its citizens. 129 Punishment for refusal to perform mil-
itary service is generally held not to be persecution and is not motivated
by political opinion. °3 0 The BIA recognizes two exceptions to this gen-
eral rule: (1) when the government punishes an individual or a group
disproportionately for refusal to serve in the military due to the political
opinions held by such a person or group, or (2) when the government
forces individuals in the military to perform inhuman acts.13 1 If an alien
falls within one of these two exceptions, punishment for desertion or
draft evasion will qualify as persecution due to political opinion.
The BIA has made the second of these two exceptions quite difficult
to meet. The military atrocities must be so commonplace that they can
be characterized as official policy of the government. 13 2 In addition, the
international community must have condemned the military for commit-
ting acts contrary to the basic rules of human conduct. The BIA, how-
ever, has refused to accept reports of atrocities from nongovernmental
organizations such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch.1 33
The BIA has made no exception for conscientious objectors, unless a
government's conscription laws are carried out in a persecutory manner
and conscientious objectors are singled out for persecution.13"
The BIA appears to have held that insurgent military groups have
many of the same rights as recognized governments. Thus, those who
are forcibly impressed by guerrilla groups cannot claim to be victims of
political persecution.13 5 Nor can those who desert guerrilla groups and
127. 821 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1987).
128. Id. at 1401. See also Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1988). The
Salvadoran government believed the petitioner to be a guerrilla and attempted to
persecute him for it. The BIA rejected the alien's claim for relief because the false
charges arose out of a personal dispute. Id. at 533-34.
129. See In re Virgil, Interim Decision No. 3050, at 9 (BIA 1988) ("It is a long-
established principle of international law that a sovereign government has the right
to draft its citizens and maintain an army for the purpose of self defense.").
130. Id. at 10.
131. See In re A. G., Interim Decision No. 3040, at 6 (BIA 1987), aff'd sub nom. M.A.
A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
132. Id. at 6-7.
133. Id. at 7.
134. See In re Canas, Interim Decision No. 3074, at 12-13 (BIA 1988). See also
Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 723 (9th Cir. 1990), petitionfor cert. filed, No. 90-
1246, 59 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1991) ("The BIA gave great weight to the
facially neutral characteristics of the Salvadoran conscription policy.").
135. See In re Virgil, at 8:
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fear retribution claim they are being persecuted because of their polit-
ical opinions.' 3 6 The argument is that guerrilla groups are acting as
legitimate military groups pursuing neutral policies and maintaining dis-
cipline, and thus any punishment would not be related to the deserter's
political opinion.
d. Prosecution
The BIA maintains that legitimate prosecution of accused criminals is
not persecution.13 7 The BIA presumes that prosecutions are legitimate,
and if "the government has some reason to believe-no matter how
slight-that a person has engaged in criminal activity, then any action
the government takes under that belief-no matter how harsh-is 'legiti-
mate' and cannot amount to persecution."'138 The BIA's approach
apparently includes crimes based on opposition to the government,
although the BIA has made an exception for attempting to overthrow a
government where a coup was the only means to effect political
change. 13 9
2. Judicial Approach
The courts have uniformly held that persecution alone is not enough to
create eligibility for asylum or withholding of deportation. 14 0 The per-
secution an alien fears must be motivated by the alien's political activity
or political opinion. Courts have generally agreed that activities such as
party membership,' 4 1 participation in political demonstrations, 14 2 and
membership in anti-government unions 143 are political activity. Unlike
the BIA, courts also agree that an alien need not necessarily hold an
opinion to fear persecution. What is critical is that the persecuting
The purpose of this recruitment, however, is to further the guerrillas' objec-
tive of overthrowing the Salvadoran Government; the intent of the recruit-
ment is not the persecution of young Salvadoran males on account of one of
the five grounds listed in the Act.
136. See Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office Imm., 894 F.2d 1292, 1296 (11 th Cir.
1990) (holding that the BIA determined that the retribution feared from guerrillas
for having deserted them was not persecution based on political opinion).
137. See Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1988).
138. Ramirez-Rivas, 899 F.2d at 867-68 (describing the INS's argument).
139. See In re Izatula, Interim Decision No. 3127, at 8 (BIA 1990) (holding that
prosecution for assisting mujahedin was persecution where Afghanistan citizens were
not able peacefully to change their government); but see Perera-Escobar, 894 F.2d at
1296-97 (upholding Board's determination that punishment for association with Sal-
vadoran guerrillas was not political persecution but legitimate prosecution).
140. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985) ("A clear
probability that an alien's life or freedom is threatened, without any indication of the
basis for the threat, is generally insufficient .... ).
141. See, e.g., Garcia-Ramos v. INS, 775 F.2d 1370, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
that evidence of membership and activities in persecuted political groups demon-
strates political activity).
142. See, e.g., Saballo-Cortez v. INS, 761 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 1984) (denying
eligibility for relief where the alien did not demonstrate political activity).
143. See, e.g., Zavala-Banilla v. INS, 730 F.2d 562, 563-65 (9th Cir. 1984).
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group believe that the alien holds such a view. 14 4
Courts have disagreed over (1) whether neutrality is an expression
of political opinion; (2) whether persecution of those resisting military
conscription, either by the government or anti-government groups, is
politically motivated; and (3) whether prosecution can be a pretext for
persecution.
a. Neutrality
No other question concerning refugees has divided the appellate courts
as has the question of whether political neutrality qualifies as an expres-
sion of political opinion. No less than four distinct positions on this
issue can be identified.
The Ninth Circuit, in Bolanos-Hernandez,14 5 was first to accept the
proposition that political neutrality could be an expression of political
opinion. Bolanos-Hernandez, a native of El Salvador, claimed his life
was in danger because he refused to join an anti-government guerrilla
group. 14 6 The government argued, and the BIA agreed, that a decision
to remain politically neutral is not a political choice. 14 7 In rejecting the
government's position, the court stated:
When a person is aware of contending political forces and affirmatively
chooses not to join any faction, that choice is a political one .... A rule
that one must identify with one of two dominant warring political factions
in order to possess a political opinion.., would frustrate one of the basic
objectives of the Refugee Act of 1980-to provide protection to all vic-
tims of persecution regardless of ideology.
148
The Ninth Circuit went even further in Maldonado-Cruz,149 holding that
simply refusing to join a guerrilla group is sufficient to express
neutrality.15 0
The Eleventh Circuit has taken the extreme opposite position. In
Perlera-Escobar,15 t the court explicitly rejected the idea that neutrality
144. See Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1990) (Political persecu-
tion under § 243(h) "includes persecution not only on account of political opinions
that the alien actually holds, but also on account of opinions that the persecutor
falsely attributes to the alien.").
145. 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984).
146. Id. at 1280.
147. Id. at 1286. The government argued that a decision to remain neutral is
always apolitical. In the alternative, the government sought to require that an alien
prove that he or she chose neutrality for political reasons. The court rejected both
contentions. Id.
148. Id.
149. 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
150. Id. at 791. See also Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988). Arteaga was
asked to join a guerrilla group and was "threatened with kidnapping or conscription"
if he refused. The court held that refusal to join the guerrillas demonstrated his lack
of support for the guerrillas and "his adoption of a neutral position towards both
sides in the Salvadoran civil war." Id. at 1231.
151. 894 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990).
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can qualify as political opinion. 15 2 The court held that to adopt such a
position "would create a sink hole that would swallow the rule [that per-
secution must be politically motivated]. 1 53
The First and Fourth Circuits fall somewhere in between these two
extreme positions. The Fourth Circuit has declined either to accept or
to reject the idea of neutrality.15 4 It has, however, suggested that if it
accepted the theory of neutrality, it would at least require, as does the
BIA, that an alien "show that he has affirmatively made a decision to
remain neutral" and has or could be singled out because of his
neutrality. 15 5
The First Circuit has agreed with this formulation, 15 6 but has cre-
ated an additional test. In Novoa-Umania,15 7 the court stated that to
prove a claim of neutrality, an alien must show that a reasonable person
would fear one of the following:
(1) that a group with the power to persecute him intends to do so specifi-
cally because the group dislikes neutrals, or (2) that such a group intends
to persecute him because he will not accept its political point of view, or
(3) that one or more such groups intend to persecute him because each
(incorrectly) thinks he holds the political views of the other side. 15 8
As the third part of the Novoa-Umania test shows, persecution because of
neutrality and the doctrine of imputed opinion may overlap. In areas of
intense civil war, such as El Salvador, attitudes such as "you're either
with us or against us" may be prevalent. In such cases, it would not be
unusual for one side or both to assume that a neutral party supported
the other side.
b. Military Conscription
(1) Government
As a general proposition, courts will not question a government's draft
or conscription policy. 159 A government has the right to draft its citi-
zens and to prosecute those who refuse military service. 160 Courts
agree that even if punishment for refusal to serve in the army can be
called persecution, it is not because of political opinion. 16 1 "Absent
152. Id. at 1297 n.4. ("This circuit has not adopted the Ninth Circuit's belief that
political neutrality is a political opinion for purposes of the Act.")
153. Id. at 1298.
154. Cruz-Lopez v. INS, 802 F.2d 1518, 1520 n.3 (4th Cir. 1986) (because alien
did not meet the requisite probability of persecution, the court declined to express
an opinion).
155. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 315 (4th Cir. 1990).
156. Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS, 896 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1990) (adopting the for-
mulation of the BIA).
157. 896 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990).
158. Id. at 3.
159. M.A. A26851062, 899 F.2d at 312 ("International law and Board precedent
are very clear that a sovereign nation enjoys the right to enforce its law of conscrip-
tion .... ").
160. Id.
161. Umanzor-Alvarado, 896 F.2d at 15.
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exceptional circumstances, it is not the place of the judiciary to evaluate
the political justifications of the actions of foreign governments."' 162
The courts, unlike the BIA, have created numerous exceptions to
this strict rule. The first exception is for those with genuine pacifist
beliefs or religious objections to military service. In reversing the BIA,
the Ninth Circuit has held that refusal to perform military service due to
religious beliefs "places [the alien] in a position of political neutral-
ity .... ,"163 The First Circuit has held that "genuine pacifist beliefs"
may entitle an alien to an exception, but the alien must show that he
"affirmatively made a decision to remain neutral."' 16 4 Since many of the
circuits have either rejected or not addressed the issue of neutrality, it
seems that this exception is far from universally accepted. Even where it
is accepted, circuits may differ drastically on the amount of proof
required.
The second major exception to the broad statement that govern-
ments have a right to enforce their draft laws is in the area of human
rights violations. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have held that prosecu-
tion for desertion or draft evasion is persecution based on political opin-
ion if the alien is "required to engage in inhuman conduct"16 5 or act
"contrary to the basic rules of human conduct."' 6 6 The two circuits,
however, would apply this exception quite differently. In character with
its decisions in other cases covering different aspects of political asylum,
the Ninth Circuit would probably rely on the credibility of the alien's
testimony of inhuman conduct, and apparently would not require
independent corroboration of military atrocities.' 6 7
The Fourth Circuit's test is much less generous. In M.A.
A26851062 v. INS, 16 8 the court basically adopted the position of the
BIA. The court held that "an alien will be considered eligible for asylum
in those rare cases in which . . . the alien would be associated with a
military whose acts are condemned by the international community as
contrary to the basic rules of human conduct .... -169 The standard is
much more difficult to meet than it appears. The court first requires
that the "violence be connected with official government policy."' 7 0
Thus, under the Fourth Circuit's standard, if an alien has the misfortune
162. Kaveh-Haghigy v. INS, 783 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986).
163. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 728 (9th Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed,
No. 90-1246, 59 U.S.L.W. 3565 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1991). The court was influenced by the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugee's argument that "refusal to bear arms is a
uniquely political statement." Id. at 728 n.23.
164. Umanzor-Alvarado, 896 F.2d at 15.
165. Barraza-Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990).
166. M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 312 (4th Cir. 1990).
167. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
168. 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990).
169. Id. at 312.
170. Id. "It is inevitable that there will be acts of misconduct during war, especially
during civil war." The court seemed concerned that without a requirement that such
violence be connected with official government policy almost any male of draft age
from a country at war could show a well-founded fear of persecution. Id.
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to be drafted into an unofficial group such as a renegade "death squad,"
any punishment he might suffer for refusal to obey an order requiring
inhuman conduct or for desertion would not qualify as persecution
based on political opinion. The court has also held that before such an
exception will be granted, government atrocities must be officially con-
demned by international bodies, and that condemnation from a nongov-
ernmental organization such as Amnesty International and Americas
Watch will not be sufficient.' 7 ' Forcing aliens to prove both that official
policy encourages human rights violations and that atrocities have been
officially condemned sets a near impossible standard. It is hard to see
how an alien could meet such a standard short of showing official con-
demnation by the United Nations.
(2) Anti-Government Groups
American courts, unlike the BIA, have generally refused to recognize the
right of foreign anti-government groups to conscript troops and punish
deserters and draft evaders, a right that they have willingly acknowl-
edged must be granted to recognized foreign governments. Most courts
have come to the conclusion that, as "nongovernmental groups lack
legitimate authority to conscript persons into their armies, their acts of
conscription are tantamount to kidnapping and constitute
persecution." 17 2
In a major departure from this general rule, the Eleventh Circuit in
Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration 17 3 has followed the BIA
position, holding that "harm and threats that may incidentally result
from behavior meant to achieve a political objective, be it the overthrow
of the existing government or, alternatively, the defense of the govern-
ment against armed insurrection, is not persecution on account of polit-
ical opinion."' 74 Based on this general position, the court has held that
neither forced recruitment by the government nor by guerrilla groups
constitutes persecution based on political opinion. 175 Similarly, the
Eleventh Circuit has said that punishment of deserters of guerrilla units
171. Id. at 312-13. "A standard of asylum eligibility based solely on pronounce-
ments of private organizations or the news media is problematic almost to the point
of being non-justiciable." Id. at 313. Presumably, the court here was worried that
this would force the judiciary to make policy choices better left to the executive
branch: condemning foreign governments as human rights abusers. It could also
cast doubt on U.S. foreign policy, and might allow any private organization claim of
human rights abuses to serve as a basis for asylum eligibility.
172. Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1990). See also Arteaga v. INS,
836 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir. 1988). Arteaga was threatened with forced conscription into
a guerrilla group. The court held that Arteaga decided not to join the guerrilla
group for political reasons and that overbearing his will would be political persecu-
tion. "It is not relevant that the guerrillas may have been interested in conscripting
Arteaga to fill their ranks rather than to 'punish' Arteaga's neutrality." Id. at 1232
n.8.
173. 894 F.2d 1292 (11 th Cir. 1990).
174. Id. at 1297.
175. Id.
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fails to qualify as political persecution. 176
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Zacarias v. INS,
which presented the opportunity to resolve this split among the cir-
cuits. 177 The Court agreed to decide whether forced participation in a
guerrilla organization necessarily constitutes political persecution. 178
c. Prosecution
Courts have been hesitant to interfere with the application of another
country's laws, or to term prosecution as persecution. Not only does a
government generally have the right to prosecute an individual accused
of criminal activity, but it has been noted that "it is not the place of the
judiciary to evaluate the political justifications of the actions of foreign
governments." 179
The Ninth Circuit has been the most willing to scrutinize the
prosecutorial actions of foreign governments. It has created a presump-
tion of politically motivated action when the government exerts military
force upon individuals or groups without reason to suspect that a partic-
ular individual or group has engaged in criminal activity.'8 0 The court
has also held that when "a government harms or punishes someone
without undertaking 'any formal prosecutorial measures,' it engages in
persecution not legitimate prosecution."' 18 1
Having described the procedures for obtaining asylum and with-
holding of deportation, and having examined the various interpretations
of the Refugee Act by the BIA and the circuit courts of appeals, this
Note will now examine interpretive sources that should guide adjudica-
tors in their decision-making process.
II. Interpretive Sources
This Section will examine the legislative history of the Refugee Act of
1980, international sources upon which the Act was based, and other
international sources that were intended to be interpretive guides.
A. Legislative History
The Refugee Act states that Congress was motivated to pass the Act by
the enduring "historic policy of the United States to respond to the
urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands."' 182
176. Id. at 1298. The court argued that punishment for desertion is simply a
means of enforcing discipline, which any paramilitary group must be able to do if it is
to survive. Id.
177. Zacarias v. INS, 908 F.2d 1452, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct.
2008 (1991).
178. See infra notes 306-27 and accompanying text.
179. Kaveh-Haghigy v. INS, 783 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986).
180. Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985).
181. Ramirez-Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1990).
182. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 101, 94 Stat. 101, 102 (1980)
(codified as Congressional Declaration of Policy and Objectives, 8 U.S.C. § 1521
(1982)).
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Congress sought to provide "statutory meaning to our national commit-
ment to human rights and humanitarian concerns."' 18 3
Senator Edward Kennedy, the chief sponsor of Senate Bill 643,
which eventually became the Refugee Act of 1980, stated that the Act
would "make our law conform to the United Nations Convention and
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which we signed in
1969."184 Kennedy also stated that "[t]his Act gives statutory meaning
to our national commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns
... [and will] insure greater equity in our treatment of all refugees."' 185
Representative Elizabeth Holtzman, the sponsor of House Bill
2816, the House counterpart to Senate Bill 643, speaking on the confer-
ence report reconciling the House and Senate versions of the Bill, stated
that "the conference report adopts the House definition of the term 'ref-
ugee,' which essentially conforms to that used under the United Nations
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees."'" She
later stated that "the conferees intend that the new sections be imple-
mented consistent [sic] with those international documents. ' 187
The Refugee Act marked the first time that asylum provisions had
been codified in U.S. law. Asylum had previously only been available
administratively. 188 The Act modified the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 by codifying a definition of "refugee,"' 8 9 and eliminating
the geographical and ideological preferences that dominated the prior
system. 190 The purpose of the Act was "to move away from ad hoc refu-
gee admission procedures and to create mechanisms to resolve the
ongoing friction between the Executive and Congress over control of
and standards for refugee admissions."' 91 By including a definition of
"refugee" that paralleled that in the U.N. Convention and Protocol, the
Act removed ideology from the system by "requiring that only a well-
founded fear of persecution be established."' 9 2 It is clear, therefore,
that the Congress intended the Refugee Act to conform to the U.S.'s
international obligations concerning refugees.
The international sources upon which the Refugee Act was based,
the U.N. Convention and Protocol, and their interpretive sources, are
therefore critical in determining the proper interpretation of the Act.
183. S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980, U.S.C.C.A.N.
141, 141.
184. 126 CONG. REC. 3756 (1980).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 4499.
187. Id. at 4500.
188. Id.
189. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1157 (1952)).
190. Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative His-
tory of the RefugeeAct of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 13 (1981).
191. Id. at 12.
192. Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled
Promise, 17 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 243, 250-51 (1983).
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B. United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Convention) was
first signed in 1951.1 9 3 In the preamble to the Convention, the United
Nations recognized as one of its principles that "human beings shall
enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination," and
that the U.N. has "manifested its profound concern for refugees and
endeavored to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of those fun-
damental rights and freedoms." 19 4
Article 1 of the Convention states that the term "refugee" shall
apply to any person who:
[as] a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it. 195
The Convention does not grant a right of asylum to those who qualify as
refugees, but requires individual states to respect the basic rights of ref-
ugees. It requires states to show respect for the religious freedom of
refugees at least to the extent shown to their own citizens.1 9 6 It also
requires states to treat a refugee at least as well as other aliens with
respect to property rights, 19 7 access to courts,' 9 8 employment opportu-
nities, 19 9 and education200 as well as granting refugees other rights
against discrimination. 20 1 Article 3 states that these provisions shall
apply "to refugees without discrimination as to race, religion, or country
of national origin."'20 2
Although the United States has never formally become a party to
the Convention, the U.S. signed, and the Senate ratified, the 1967
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Proto-
col).20 3 The Protocol makes Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention
binding upon its signatories. The Protocol also eliminates any restric-
tion that the fear of persecution relate to events that occurred prior to
1951, and requires that the Protocol be applied without geographic
193. See Convention, supra note 4.
194. Convention, supra note 4, 19 U.S.T. 6260.
195. Id. at 6261.
196. Id. at 6264, art. 4.
197. Id. at 6267, art. 13.
198. Id. at 6268, art. 16.
199. Id. at 6269, arts. 17,18.
200. Id. at 6271, art. 22.
201. See generally id. at 6264-76, arts. 4-34.
202. Id. at 6264.
203. Protocol, supra note 4.
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limits. 20 4
The Convention and Protocol are important because they express a
desire to protect the lives and fundamental rights of "refugees" and cre-
ate a uniform definition of "refugee": one who has a well-founded fear
of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.20 5 While the Convention
and Protocol do not grant a refugee the right of asylum, they require
that signatories use the recognized definition of refugee when determin-
ing an alien's status, and require that signatories conduct refugee policy
without territorial or ideological bias. In addition, the Protocol requires
parties to the agreement to cooperate with the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 20 6 This suggests
that any guidance given by the UNHCR should be highly influential in
interpreting the Protocol and Convention.
C. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
The U.N. Handbook, published in 1979 by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, was intended to be an inter-
pretive guide to the Convention and Protocol. In particular, the Hand-
book gives guidance to interpreting the definition of refugee and the
phrase "political opinion."
To qualify as a refugee, an alien must have a "well-founded" fear of
persecution.20 7 The U.N. Handbook states that since "fear is subjective,
the definition involves a subjective element in the person .... Determi-
nation of refugee status will therefore primarily require an evaluation of
the applicant's statements rather than a judgment of the situation pre-
vailing in his [or her] country of origin.'" 20 8 The Handbook then dis-
cusses the "well-founded" component of the test, noting that an alien's
"frame of mind must be supported by an objective situation."'20 9 In
establishing the objective level of fear, it is not necessary for those adju-
dicating the alien's claim to condemn his or her home country. But the
alien's testimony cannot be reviewed without an inquiry into the condi-
tions of his or her country of origin. "Knowledge of conditions in the
applicant's country of origin.., is an important element in assessing the
applicant's credibility. '" 2 10
The U.N. Handbook points out that an alien can have a well-founded
fear without having personally been the victim of persecution. 2 1 1 The
experiences of his or her friends and relatives or members of an alien's
race or social group may lead the alien justifiably to believe that he or
204. Id. at 19 U.S.T. 6225.
205. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
206. Protocol, supra note 4, 19 U.S.T. at 6226.
207. Convention, supra note 4, 19 U.S.T. at 6261, art. I(A)(2).
208. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 11, para. 37.
209. Id. at 11, para. 38.
210. Id. at 12, para. 42.
211. Id. at 13, para. 43.
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she will be persecuted in the future.2 12 An alien must, though, show
"good reason why he individually fears persecution." 21
-
3 The U.N.
Handbook suggests that adjudicators should consider all factors and not
place undue weight upon any one factor.2 14 For example, the posses-
sion of a valid passport by an alien should not necessarily indicate that
he or she does not have a well-founded fear. 2 15 While the passport may
suggest that the country does not intend to persecute the alien, there are
many other reasons why an alien may have a passport, including the pos-
sibility that the country is unaware of the alien's political opinions or
that the country simply wishes to get rid of undesirables. 21 6
A threat to life or freedom of the alien on account of the alien's
political opinion is always persecution.2 17 Other serious violations of
human rights would also constitute persecution.2 18 Whether such harm
or threats constitute persecution must be determined by the individual
circumstances in each case. The subjective element discussed previously
would be important.2 1 9 In addition, the Handbook suggests that there
may be occasions where certain acts alone would not amount to persecu-
tion, but could equal persecution when combined with other factors
such as the general climate of the country. 2 20
For persecution to qualify as political persecution, an alien must
show that he or she holds opinions different from those of the govern-
ment and that he or she has "a fear of persecution for holding such
opinions." 221 If a government falsely attributes opinions to an alien for
which he or she will be persecuted, this will also suffice. 2 22 The opin-
ions held by an alien must generally be known by the government before
the treatment of a person will qualify as political persecution. 223 It is
possible, however, that an alien may have strongly held opinions but has
yet to express them, or has expressed them but they have yet to come to
the attention of the government. In such cases, if it is reasonable to
assume that the government will soon become aware of the alien's opin-
ions, the alien's fear can be considered well-founded. 224
212. Id. at 13, para. 43.
213. Id. at 13, para. 45.
214. Id. at 48, para. 201.
215. Id. at 13, para. 47.
216. Id. at 13-14, paras. 47, 48.
217. Id. at 14, para. 51.
218. Id. The Handbook does not, however, specify what these serious violations are.
219. Id. at 14, para. 52.
220. Id. at 14, paras. 52, 53. The Handbook suggests that prejudicial actions, such
as discrimination, when combined with other factors, such as a general atmosphere
of insecurity in the country of origin, may justify a claim of a well-founded fear of
persecution.
221. Id. at 19, para. 80.
222. Id. The requirement that persecution be politically motivated presupposes
that the government is aware of the alien's political opinions "or [political opinions]
are attributed to the applicant." Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 20, para. 82.
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The U.N. Handbook acknowledges the right of governments to
require their citizens to perform military service and to punish draft
evaders and deserters, 225 but the Handbook also recognizes exceptions.
If the punishment for draft evasion is disproportionately severe because
of the alien's race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion, it is persecution.2 2 6 Paragraph 172
states that an alien may be able to establish a claim of refugee status if he
or she can show that refusal to perform military service is based on gen-
uine religious or moral convictions. 2 27 This suggests that the U.N.
Handbook would recognize refugee status for conscientious objectors. 2 28
The U.N. Handbook would also recognize an exception when an alien
could show that he or she would have been required to engage in acts
"contrary to basic rules of human conduct."' 22 9
The U.N. Handbook recognizes that prosecution by a government
may be a pretext for persecution based on political opinions. If the pros-
ecution is due to an alien's political opinion, it is clearly political perse-
cution.2 30 However, if the prosecution is based upon a politically
motivated act and the punishment is in accordance with the general laws
of a country, such prosecution is not necessarily political persecution.
"Whether an apolitical offender can also be considered a refugee will
depend upon various other factors. Prosecution for an offence may,
depending upon the circumstances, be a pretext for punishing the
offender for his political opinions or the expression thereof."'2 3 1
Prosecution may amount to persecution if the punishment is exces-
sive. 23 2 Prosecution under a law that does not conform to accepted
human rights standards would also be persecution. 23 3 In addition, the
application of the law, rather than the law itself, may provide a pretext
for persecution. 234
The U.N. Handbook provides additional general principles applica-
ble to all asylum adjudications. The Handbook recognizes that it may be
225. Id. at 39-40, para. 167.
226. Id. at 40, para. 169.
227. Id. at 40, para. 172.
228. See id. at 40, para. 170.
[T]he necessity to perform military service may be the sole ground for a claim
to refugee status, i.e., when a person can show that the performance of mili-
tary service would have required his participation in military action contrary
to his genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of
conscience.
See also id. at 40-4 1, para. 173. ("The question as to whether objection to performing
military service for reasons of conscience can give rise to a valid claim to refugee
status should also be considered in light of more recent developments in this field.")
229. Id. at 40, paras. 170, 171.
230. Id. at 20, para. 84.
231. Id. at 20, paras. 84, 85.
232. Id. at 15, para. 57.
233. Id. at 16, para. 59.
234. Id. The Handbook cites as an example prosecution for distribution of pam-
phlets, which could be a "vehicle for the persecution of the individual on the grounds
of the political content of the publication." Id.
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difficult or impossible for an alien to provide documentary evidence to
substantiate a claim of persecution, and that it is not unusual for an alien
to have only his or her own testimony as evidence. 2 35 In light of this,
where the applicant's testimony appears credible, he or she should be
given the benefit of the doubt.236 Paragraph 197 goes farther, explicitly
stating that a requirement of corroborating evidence should be relaxed
in view of the inherent proof problems that the alien faces.
2 37
The interpretive sources show that the U.N. Convention and Proto-
col formulated a definition of the term "refugees" binding upon its sig-
natories, and that the Refugee Act has codified that definition into U.S.
law. The U.N. Handbook was designed to interpret the requirements of
the Convention and Protocol, and the legislative history behind the Ref-
ugee Act shows that the Act was intended to codify the U.S.'s interna-
tional obligations stemming from these treaties. The remainder of this
Note will analyze the effect this should have on specific factual situations
in asylum adjudications.
M. Analysis
There are several areas of disagreement between the BIA and the circuit
courts, and within the circuits themselves. This Note argues that reli-
ance upon the general purposes of the Refugee Act and upon the inter-
national interpretive sources provides solutions to many of these
disagreements. Part A of this Section argues that Congress, in passing
the Refugee Act, intended to bring U.S. law into conformance with the
international obligations of the United States, and that the U.N. Hand-
book should be used to determine the extent of those international obli-
gations. Part B analyzes the BIA's role in formulating U.S. refugee
policy and argues that the BIA has not implemented the Congressional
mandate, but has instead pursued its own political agenda. Part C looks
at specific areas of disagreement between the BIA and the courts and
proposes solutions based upon the U.N. Handbook and the general pur-
poses of the Refugee Act of 1980.
A. Congressional Intent and the International Obligations of the
United States
Congress, in passing the Refugee Act, expressed a clear intent to bring
U.S. law into conformance with its international obligations under the
235. Id. at 47, para. 196.
Often, however, an applicant may not be able to support his statements by
documentary or other proof, and cases in which an applicant can provide
evidence of all his statements will be the exception rather than the rule. In
most cases a person fleeing from persecution will have arrived with the barest
necessities and very frequently even without personal documents.
Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 47, para. 197.
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United Nations Convention and Protocol. 2 38 Indicative of this intent
are statements of promoters of the Act 23 9 as well as the use of the defini-
tion of the term "refugee" identical to the definition employed by the
U.N. Convention and Protocol. 240
The U.N High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) promulgated
a handbook designed to help adjudicators determine whether an alien
should qualify as a "refugee" under the Protocol and Convention and
thus be eligible for asylum and entitled to withholding of deportation.
The UNHCR is a venerable seventy-year-old United Nations' office
whose purpose is to formulate U.N. policy towards refugees. 241 Signa-
tories to the Protocol are required to cooperate with the UNHCR. 24 2
This suggests that the Protocol requires its signatories to consider the
U.N. Handbook in determining the asylum status of aliens and to follow
the guidance of the U.N. Handbook whenever relevant. In addition, the
U.N. Handbook was published in 1979, one year before the Refugee Act
became effective. Given that the Act was intended to conform U.S. law
to that required under international treaties, and the fact that Congress
was aware of the U.N. Handbook at the time the Act was passed, 243 it is
reasonable to believe that Congress intended asylum adjudicators to
rely on the U.N. Handbook whenever possible. Although the BIA and the
courts have recognized the U.N. Handbook as a persuasive guide, the
extent to which courts and the BIA have relied on the U.N. Handbook has
varied significantly. 244
B. The Role of the BIA
The BIA has become an influential force in formulating U.S. refugee
policy. The Attorney General has delegated to the BIA the authority to
determine whether an alien meets the statutory definition of "refu-
238. See supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
239. Id.
240. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988) with Convention, supra note 4, 19
U.S.T. at 61, art. l(a)(2).
241. For an analysis of the history of international refugee law see Guy S. GOOD-
WIN-GIL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983). The League of Nations
appointed a High Commissioner for Russian refugees in 1921 to define the status of
and offer relief to refugees. Id. at 127. In 1950, the United Nations created the
UNHCR in order to assist all refugees. G. A. Res. 428 (v), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
242. Protocol, supra note 4, 19 U.S.T. at 6226, art. II. § 1.
243. See U.S. Refugee Program: Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. of Immigration,
Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
24, 26 (1981) (Memorandum from Theodore B. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel, to David Crossland, General Counsel INS) ("We assume
that Congress was aware of the criteria articulated in the Handbook when it passed
the Act in 1980, and that it is appropriate to consider the guidelines in the Handbook
as an aid to construction of the Act.").
244. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 439 (1987) ("We do not suggest, of
course, that the explanation in the U.N. Handbook has the force of law .... Nonethe-
less, the Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which
Congress sought to conform."); In re Acosta, Interim Decision No. 2986 (BIA 1985)
(BIA holding that the Handbook is not controlling).
1992 Persecution Based on Political Opinion
gee," 245 or whether an alien faces a clear threat to life or freedom neces-
sary to be entitled to withholding of deportation. 24 6 Adjudications of
asylum applications are very much fact-based and decisions often come
down to issues of credibility.
It is not unusual for an alien to be unable to present corroboratory
witnesses or documentary evidence of persecution. It would also be
unusual for the group or government that the alien has accused of per-
secution to appear in a U.S. court to refute the alien's claims. Thus, the
BIA may be forced to decide the issue solely on the testimony of the
alien. If the BIA finds the alien not to be credible, the alien has lost.
When the legal issues are dear, credibility becomes the only issue.
Because most asylum cases turn on questions of credibility, some
courts have limited the deference given to the BIA's determinations of
fact in order to retain some judicial control. The Ninth Circuit's attempt
at judicial oversight seems reasonable. 24 7 This formulation, requiring
specific reasons for negative findings of credibility, gives the court an
adequate record upon which to review immigration judge and BIA find-
ings, while giving deference to finders of fact who are best able to make
factual determinations. Requiring specific reasons for findings of non-
credibility may also separate some questions of law from questions of
fact.24
8
In addition to deciding questions of fact, the BIA must interpret the
Refugee Act of 1980. Even if an alien is credible, the BIA must deter-
mine if the alien meets the statutory requirements of a "refugee" as a
matter of law. The BIA must decide such issues as whether neutrality is
an expression of political opinion and the effect of persecution from a
nongovernmental group. Relying on general concepts of administrative
law, courts have shown deference to "reasonable" agency interpreta-
tions of law.24 9 Consequently, the BIA has assumed a powerful role as a
maker of refugee policy.
Generally, the BIA has restricted the scope of the Refugee Act.
First, the BIA makes it difficult to prove a well-founded fear of persecu-
245. An alien is eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum if he or she meets the
definition of refugee. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
246. A clear threat to life or freedom is the standard an alien must meet in order to
be entitled to withholding of deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988). The Supreme
Court has interpreted this standard to indicate that the alien must show that it is
more likely than not that he or she will face persecution if deported to his or her
home country. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
248. For example, an Immigration Judge's findings that an alien's testimony is not
credible could indicate that the judge finds as a matter of law that the alien's uncor-
roborated testimony is not credible. Requiring reasons for findings of non-credibility
helps to separate questions of fact (is the alien believable?) from questions of law (is
corroborating evidence required for an alien's testimony to be credible?).
249. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. Whether this deference to
administrative agencies is a good idea is an issue beyond the scope of this Note. It is
clear, however, that through the doctrine of deference the BIA has assumed a power-
ful role in U.S. refugee policy.
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tion.2 50 The alien must show that the accused persecutors have made
specific, direct threats towards the alien as an individual, and must pres-
ent corroborating evidence to support these allegations. 25 ' If the alien
possesses a passport, or was able to remain in the country after initial
incidents of persecution, the BIA cites these factors as evidence of a lack
of a well-founded fear (or lack of a willingness by the persecutor to
persecute) .252
Even if the alien shows a well-founded fear of persecution, he or she
must still prove the persecution is politically motivated.2 53 The BIA
makes this difficult by refusing to allow neutrality to qualify as political
opinion.2 54 Those who evade a draft in their home countries or who
face criminal prosection cannot qualify as being politically persecuted,
except within narrow exceptions. 2 55 The BIA has even declared that
persecution by guerrilla groups is not politically motivated when limited
to conscription or military discipline.256 This narrow view of the Refu-
gee Act of 1980 is supported neither by the legislative history of the Act
nor by the U.N. Convention and Protocol, on which the Act was
based.2 57
In interpreting "well-founded fear of persecution" and "political
opinion," the BIA seems to be pursuing its own political agenda (or that
of the Reagan and Bush administrations), despite explicit prohibitions
by the Protocol and clear contrary legislative intent. BIA policy appears
to have regional and ideological biases. Commentators, judges, and
even the U.S. General Accounting Office have suggested that the admin-
istrative agencies responsible for making asylum decisions have failed to
follow the Refugee Act of 1980, which requires a neutral, unbiased refu-
gee policy. 258 Aliens from Communist countries and countries on poor
terms with the U.S. stand a far greater chance of gaining asylum than
250. See supra notes 51-66 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 123-39 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
257. The specific areas where BIA interpretations of the Refugee Act depart from
the intent of the Act as shown by the legislative history and other interpretive sources
will be examined in the next section. See infra notes 266-305 and accompanying text.
258. See Helton, supra note 192 (asserting that foreign and domestic policy con-
cerns jeopardize the neutral standards of the Refugee Act); M.A. A26851062 v. INS,
899 F.2d 304, 320 (4th Cir. 1990) (Winter, J., dissenting) ("The congressional direc-
tive to apply the Refugee Act neutrally has not been respected .... ); Jeffrey L.
Romig, Comment, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United
States, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 295 (1985) (suggesting that the political aspects of granting
asylum to Salvadorans have influenced the INS and the courts to interpret the refu-
gee law very strictly); United States General Accounting Office, Briefing Report to the
Honorable Arlen Spector, United States Senate, Asylum: Uniforn Application of Standards Uncer-
tain - Few Denied Applicants Deported (1987) [hereinafter GAO Report] (finding significant
differences by country in 1984 asylum approval rates).
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those from countries friendly with the U.S. 25 9 Studies show that aliens
from El Salvador, the Philippines, Pakistan and Guatemala are rarely
granted asylum, while those from Romania, Poland, Afghanistan, and
Iran have a high probability of success. 2 60
The BIA's ideological and territorial biases are illustrated in its
treatment of aliens claiming persecution by their government through
forced participation in anti-government activities. In In re Maldonado-
Cruz,2 6 1 the BIA rejected an El Salvador applicant's claim of government
persecution based on forced participation in guerrilla activities. The BIA
held that the El Salvadoran government has the legitimate power both
to investigate and to detain civilians suspected of having ties with a guer-
rilla organization, which is derived from the government's right to pro-
tect itself.262 In what can only be regarded as ideological bias, the BIA
has accepted similar claims from applicants from Cuba and Afghanistan,
concluding that fear from forced membership in a subversive group was
well-founded. 268 The BIA made no mention of the government's rights
vis-a-vis members of guerrilla groups. 2 64
The BIA has thus assumed a very powerful role in shaping U.S. ref-
ugee policy. The fact-based nature of asylum adjudications and the def-
erence shown to BIA decisions on questions of law have given the BIA
the final word in many asylum cases. The narrow view of the Refugee
Act taken by the BIA, and the continuing role that ideology plays in
asylum adjudications show that the BIA has departed from the intent of
the drafters of the Act.26 5 For the U.S. to fulfill its international obliga-
259. Helton, supra note 192, at 253. ("Ideology also continues to dominate asylum
decision making, translating into ready asylum grants for applicants who flee from
Communist-dominated regimes, and into far less generous grants to those who flee
regimes with which the United States has good relations, irrespective of their human
rights records.")
260. See M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 320 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing a 1987
study showing approval rates for asylum cases filed with INS district directors: Nica-
ragua, 83.9%, Iran, 67.47, Romania, 59.7%o, Afghanistan, 26.2%, Guatemala, 3.8%,
and El Salvador, 3.6%o); see also GAO Report, supra note 258, at 34 (1984 study on
asylum approval rates: Iran, 66%, Poland, 49%, El Salvador, 2%, Nicaragua, 7%o);
Helton, supra note 192, at 253 (1983 statistics from INS show approval rates of: Rus-
sia, 78%o, Ethiopia, 64%o, Afghanistan, 53%o, Romania, 44%, the Philippines, 11%o',
Pakistan, 12%o, Haiti, 2%6, Guatemala, 2%o, and El Salvador, 3%); see also Derek Smith,
Note, A Refugee by Any Other Name: An Examination of the Board of Immigration Appeals'
Actions in Asylum Cases, 75 VA. L. REv. 681, 711-12 and n.145 (1989) (noting that in
1987, El Salvador produced 24%o of asylum applicants, but its citizens receive only
4.57o of asylum grants).
261. Interim Decision No. 3041 (BIA 1988), rev'd, 883 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989).
262. Id. at 13. See also M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304, 320 (4th Cir. 1990)
(discussing In rejose Oscar Diaz-Alfaro, BIA unpublished dec., File No. A26267407
(Aug. 6, 1987) which rejected a similar claim from a Salvadoran applicant).
263. See M.A. A26851062, 899 F.2d at 320 (discussing In re Miguel Sopena-Fernan-
dez, BIA unpublished dec., File No. A28279551 (July 15, 1987); In re Mohammed
Osman Mohibi, BIA unpublished dec., File No. A27497579 (July 27, 1987)).
264. In re Miguel Sopena-Fernandez, at 3.
265. Some courts and commentators have suggested that inconsistency by the BIA
in interpreting the Refugee Act is a reason for showing the BIA less deference with
respect to its interpretation of the Act. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
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tions, the BIA and the political administration must remove ideology
from the system or the courts must step in when the BIA oversteps its
bounds.
C. Application of the U.N. Handbook
The balance of this Note examines specific factual circumstances that
have caused disagreements between the BIA and the circuit courts, and
shows how these disagreements can be resolved by referring to the U.N.
Handbook and the general purposes of the Refugee Act.
1. Persecution
a. Specificity of Threats
An alien should not have to show that he or she has specifically been
threatened or targeted for persecution in order to prove a well-founded
fear of persecution. The words "well-founded" in the definition of refu-
gee appear to require an objective component; and requiring an alien to
show specific facts supporting and explaining the reasons for his or her
fear does not seem unreasonable. But it seems quite possible for one to
show a "reasonable" fear without showing that the feared persecutor
had already targeted the alien. The alien may deduce from persecution
of friends or family that he or she may also be slated for persecution.
He or she may also spot a pattern of persecution common to those with
similar traits.
Paragraph 43 of the U.N. Handbook supports this view and states
that an alien can have a "well-founded fear without showing that he has
personally been the victim of persecution.- 2 66 The Handbook implies it
is sufficient to show good reason for the alien personally to fear persecu-
tion, but does not require evidence of specific incidents of persecution
towards the alien.26 7 It is contrary to the spirit of the Refugee Act of
1980 and the Convention and Protocol to require an alien to wait until
he or she is actually targeted before concluding the alien has a "reason-
able fear."
An alien seeking a withholding of deportation should be required to
show greater specificity of threats than an alien seeking asylum. With-
holding of deportation requires that an alien show a higher probability
of persecution than an alien must show for asylum.268 This difference in
standards suggests that more specificity should be required when seek-
ing withholding of deportation than when asserting eligibility of asylum;
because the more specific the threat, the more likely the harm will occur.
446 n.30 (1987); M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d at 320, 321. See also Smith, supra
note 260, at 720. ("Because the Refugee Act was intended to create an ideologically
neutral asylum process . . ., the Board has a responsibility to eliminate actual and
apparent political and foreign policy influences from its decisions whenever
possible.").
266. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 13, para. 43.
267. Id. at 13, para. 45.
268. See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
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The specificity of threats should be considered along with the gen-
eral level of violence in the alien's home country. 269 The greater the
level of violence in a country, the more likely that one who has received
threats, or whose friends or family have been threatened, will actually be
persecuted. Thus, the specificity of threats required for a determination
of a "well-founded fear of persecution" should depend upon the relief
desired and the level of violence in the alien's home country.
No court has adopted the approach that this Note suggests. How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit approaches this standard with respect to the level
of violence in the alien's home country. The Ninth Circuit has held that
the level of violence is relevant in deciding whether an alien's fear is
well-founded and that an alien need show less specific threats when
there is a high level of violence.2 70 The Fourth Circuit panel opinion in
M.A. A26851062 v. INS adopted the approach espoused by this Note
regarding the specificity of threats required. 27 1 The Fourth Circuit
would require an alien only to show specific reasons supporting a well-
founded fear, not to show threats to him or her specifically. These two
approaches should be combined with an examination of the relief the
alien is seeking. This approach would comply with Paragraph 42 of the
U.N. Handbook, which requires that the general conditions of a country
be considered, 272 as well as Paragraph 44, which declares that the alien
need not individually have been threatened. 273
b. Corroborating Testimony
It is easy to see why some courts and the BIA have required an alien to
produce corroborating evidence to support a claim of a well-founded
fear of persecution. 2 74 Judges and administrators fear that without a
requirement of corroboration thousands of potential refugees would
flood the United States and overwhelm the system. Aliens would have
incentive to fabricate stories of harsh treatment.
Nevertheless, requiring corroboration not only violates specific lan-
guage in the Handbook stating that aliens should receive the benefit of
the doubt,2 75 but also prevents qualified aliens from gaining refugee
status.
269. The U.N. Handbook supports this view. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at
12, para. 42. ("The applicant's statements cannot, however, be considered in the
abstract, and must be viewed in the context of the relevant background situation.")
270. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
272. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 12, para. 42.
273. Id. at 13, para. 43. Refugee determinations "need not necessarily be based on
the applicant's own personal experience. What, for example, happened to his friends
and relatives and other members of the same racial or social group may well show
that his fear that sooner or later he also will become a victim of persecution is well-
founded." Id.
274. See supra notes 57-61, 90 and accompanying text.
275. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 47, para. 196.
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Moreover, it appears logical to assume that the greater the fear of
persecution an alien has, the less time and ability the alien has to gather
documentary evidence of persecution, assuming such evidence exists. 27 6
Even though an alien's personal testimony is self-serving, it is hard to
determine what other type of evidence most aliens could produce. Plac-
ing the burden of proof on the alien would be a sufficiently strict stan-
dard to prevent the flood of aliens that some courts (and the BIA and
the administration) fear. Personal testimony is self-serving in any trial
or proceeding, but this fact is not normally used to hold, as a matter of
law, that a claimant has not met his or her burden of proof. Indeed, in
an area where an alien's personal testimony may be the only evidence,
requiring corroboration is not feasible. This position has been explicitly
adopted by the Ninth Circuit. 277
In addition, immigration judges who find an alien's testimony unbe-
lievable should be required to give reasons for such a finding. Without
requiring such findings, politics can easily enter the determination. The
BIA could find the alien unbelievable simply because he or she is from a
country not normally associated with violence and persecution or
because the alien is from a country that the current administration does
not wish to embarrass. 2 78 Requiring reasons for findings of non-credi-
bility also provides an adequate record for judicial review. 279
c. Awareness of Political Opinions Held
Although it seems logical to conclude that political persecution cannot
occur unless the persecutor is aware of the alien's political belief, the
standard for asylum does not require persecution, but only a well-
founded fear of persecution. It is quite possible to be afraid that one's
government will at some future point discover one's political opinions
and engage in persecution based on those opinions. The reasonable-
ness of fear grows proportionately with the level of the alien's political
activity and fame. This view is clearly indicated by the Handbook.
280
A sound interpretation would allow the BIA and the courts to grant
relief without requiring the alien to show that the potential persecutor
276. See id. at 47, para. 196. ("[A]n applicant may not be able to support his state-
ments by documentary or other proof .... In most cases a person fleeing from
persecution will have arrived with the barest necessities and very frequently even
without personal documents.") See also Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and
the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1355 (1983) (interpreting the objective
evidence component to require corroborating testimony would erect a "virtually
insuperable barrier to the attainment of refugee status").
277. See Beltran-Zavala v. INS, 912 F.2d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 1990); Barraza-
Rivera v. INS, 913 F.2d 1443, 1449 (9th Cir. 1990); Bolanos-Hernandes v. INS, 767
F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984). See also supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 59-61, 258-60 and accompanying text.
279. Id.
280. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 13, para. 43. ("The situation of each person
must, however, be assessed on its own merits. In the case of a well-known personal-
ity, the possibility of persecution may be greater than in the case of a person in
obscurity.")
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was informed of the alien's beliefs. However, it would require that the
alien show a higher level of political activity or notoriety if the alien is
seeking withholding of deportation than asylum. This approach was
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Garah-Ramos v. INS.2 8 1 The court held
that because the El Salvadoran government was unaware of Garcia-
Ramos's political activities, he could not qualify for withholding of
deportation, but was eligible for asylum. 28 2
d. Persecution by Unknown Groups
Courts and the BIA have generally agreed that persecution need not
come from the alien's government. The alien need only show that the
government is unwilling or unable to control the persecutor, as may be
the case with government sponsored "death squads" or guerrilla
groups. 28 3
Considerable disagreement has occurred when the alien is unable
to pinpoint the cause of the feared persecution. Given the standard for
asylum eligibility set by the Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca, sug-
gesting that a one in ten chance of persecution might be enough to make
persecution a reasonable possibility,2 84 it is difficult to determine why
courts would require an alien seeking asylum to identify the source of
his or her fear. Certainly an alien could show a ten percent chance of
persecution by showing he or she had received a threat and that others
who had received similar threats were subsequently persecuted.
It is fundamentally different when an alien is seeking withholding of
deportation. Simply offering evidence of a threat with no proof of its
source would rarely meet the required more-likely-than-not standard,
though there may be an exception when an alien could show that an
overwhelming number of anonymous threats were acted upon. Again,
the Ninth Circuit has apparently accepted this approach. 28 5
e. Other Miscellaneous Factors
The U.N. Handbook states that possession of a passport should not defeat
an otherwise meritorious claim.28 6 Possession of a passport by an alien
should be one of many factors considered by adjudicator. Some courts
and the BIA have given passport possession considerable weight. 2
8 7
There are many valid reasons an alien could have a passport and still
have a well-founded fear of persecution.28 8
281. 775 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1990).
282. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
284. 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
285. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
286. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 13-14, paras. 47-48.
287. See supra notes 64, 111 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text. For example, the alien's gov-
ernment may not yet be aware of the alien's political activities or beliefs, or the gov-
ernment may permit the alien to leave the country, but would persecute the
individual if he or she remained in the country.
269
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Similar reasoning applies to a lack of threats to one's family and an
alien's ability to live in the same location after an initial incident of per-
secution. The BIA and some courts have used these factors to find that
an alien's testimony is not credible, or that his or her fear is
unfounded.2 89 Again, there are many explanations for these factors.2 90
These factors should only be minor factors considered as part of the
overall situation that the alien faces, and should be given little weight.
For the most part, the Ninth Circuit agrees with this approach.2 9 1
2. Political Opinion
a. Neutrality
In recent years, courts have gradually accepted the idea that neutrality is
an expression of political opinion, though they remain divided as to how
to apply the concept.2 92 The UNHCR has recognized that neutrality can
be a form of political opinion and that if an alien is persecuted due to his
or her neutrality, it is political persecution.2 93 In light of this, the BIA
and those circuits which have not adopted the doctrine of neutrality
should do so.
Questions concerning the application of neutrality still remain,
however. Must an alien prove that he or she has affirmatively adopted a
position of neutrality, and has made his or her position of neutrality
public, so that the persecuting group is aware of his or her neutrality?
In answering this question, the doctrine of "imputed opinion" and
problems of awareness overlap with neutrality. In countries with intense
civil war, it is not unusual for one side to believe that those who do not
support their cause support the opposing side. In such a case, an alien
may fear persecution from either the government or the opposing side,
or both, and such persecution would be political persecution. It is also
unrealistic to expect that one who adopts a neutral stance will announce
his position to the group that may persecute him. An alien may reason-
ably fear that either or both sides in a conflict will, at a future time,
discover his neutral position or impute to him the beliefs of the oppos-
ing side. These cases should be analyzed in the same manner as aware-
ness of any other political opinion. 29 4
Different standards should be used depending on whether the alien
is persecuted for neutrality by government or anti-government groups.
When the persecuting group is the alien's government, the courts
289. See supra notes 65-66, 116-21 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text. It is possible that the alien was
able to hide from the authorities for some time or that the government was an ineffi-
cient persecutor.
291. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
293. See Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 828 n. 23 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting
UNHCR argument in an amicus brief that "the refusal to bear arms is a uniquely
political statement").
294. See supra notes 280-82 and accompanying text.
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should use the same methods to analyze claims of neutrality as any other
claim of political persecution.
If the persecutor is an anti-government group, the standard should
be slightly different. In many cases, persecution from an anti-govern-
ment group will resemble government persecution. For example, the
group may harass the alien because he or she does not support it or
because it believes that the alien supports the other side. In these cases,
persecution from anti-government groups should be treated the same as
persecution from the alien's government. In other cases, the harm an
alien fears is not torture or death, but forcible impressment into the
ranks of the anti-government group. As suggested by the Ninth Circuit,
forcible recruitment by groups other than a legitimate government
should be considered political persecution.29 5 Simply refusing to join
an anti-government group should be enough to establish neutrality, due
to the fact the guerrilla groups do not have the legitimate conscription
powers that recognized governments have.
b. Military Conscription
i. Government
The right of a foreign government to pursue a legitimate draft or con-
scription policy must be accepted. But it is also clear that there should
be exceptions to this rule. The U.N. Handbook recognizes exceptions
where individuals are punished more harshly for draft evasion or deser-
tion due to their political opinions. 29 6 When aliens are punished arbi-
trarily or more harshly because of their political opinions, this is prima
facie persecution.2 9 7 These types of cases should be viewed as persecu-
tion based on political opinion.
The BIA and all courts have adopted the U.N. Handbook's rule
granting an exception for draft evaders and deserters when their mili-
tary engages in inhuman acts. 29 8 The courts and the BIA, however, dis-
agree over how much evidence should be required and what types of
evidence will be allowed. 2 99 When an alien claims that members of his
or her country's military are forced to commit atrocities, courts must
give this special consideration, since accepting the alien's claim will
brand the country as a human rights violator. But when courts or the
BIA require that an alien prove the atrocities are part of official govern-
ment policy or require that the country's military be condemned by the
international community, they exceed what is required by the U.N.
295. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
296. U.N. Handbook, supra note 5, at 40, paras. 169-71. See supra notes 225-26 and
accompanying text.
297. Id.
298. See supra notes 132-34, 165-173 and accompanying text.
299. Id.
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Handbook. 00 Requiring evidence of official policy may set a standard
that can never be reached, as "no government wishing to remain even
remotely connected with the international community would openly
advocate such a policy."3 0 ' Paragraph 171 of the U.N. Handbook
requires only that the military acts be "condemned by the international
community," not condemned by international governmental bodies, as
some courts and the BIA would require. 30 2 The opinions of recognized
groups such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch should be
afforded considerable weight when deciding if the international commu-
nity has condemned a country's military.3 0 3
ii. Guerrilla/Anti-Government Groups
Guerrilla groups do not and should not have the same authority to con-
script and discipline troops as legitimate governments. Therefore, if an
alien is persecuted for refusing to join or for leaving an anti-government
group, he or she should be considered a victim of political
persecution.3 0 4
c. Prosecution
Recognized governments have the right to adopt and enforce their laws,
but there are limits on what a government can do in the name of prose-
cution. Prosecution for holding a certain political belief or opinion is
clearly persecution based on political opinion. Further, courts should
follow the Ninth Circuit's lead in holding that when governments
engage in prosection without evidence of a crime, political persecution
should be presumed.3 0 5
IV. Conclusion
Congress adopted the Refugee Act of 1980 so that U.S. law would con-
form to U.S. obligations under international treaties. The Convention
and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees elucidates the United
States' obligations concerning refugees. The Reagan and Bush adminis-
300. See M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1990) (majority requiring
proof of formal, official government policy to engage in human rights violation and
condemnation by international governmental bodies).
301. Id. at 322 (Winter, J., dissenting). See also U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 5, at 40,
para. 171 (discussing only the type of military action, but making no mention of a
requirement of governmental policy).
302. M.A. A26851062, 899 F.2d at 312. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying
text.
303. M.A. A26851062, 899 F.2d at 323 (Winter, J., dissenting) ("[N]on-
governmental groups such as Amnesty International and Americas Watch have been
full and active participants in the development of human rights law, and their writ-
ings have long been considered a valid source of international law."); see also Coriolan
v. INS, 559 F.2d 993, 1002-03 (5th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he opinion of Amnesty Interna-
tional is conclusive neither upon this court nor upon the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service ... [b]ut the evaluation in this report is certainly relevant.")
304. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
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trations, through their delegate, the Board of Immigration Appeals,
have departed from these obligations by narrowly interpreting the Refu-
gee Act of 1980. The courts, by showing broad deference to the BIA,
have acquiesced in this departure from the United States' international
obligations and the original intent of the drafters of the Refugee Act.
In order to facilitate the determination of a refugee's status, the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees promulgated the Handbook on
Criteria and Procedures for Determining Refugee Status. The Handbook should
be used as a guide in interpreting the Refugee Act by both the BIA and
courts. Where possible, the BIA and courts should rely on the Handbook
to provide an interpretation of "well-founded fear of persecution" and
"political opinion." When the Handbook and Protocol do not provide
assistance, courts should consider the basic purposes behind the Act by
examining its legislative history.
Developing clear standards in areas of dispute that have been iden-
tified, and recognizing the effect these various factors have on the type
of relief sought, will help to conform the United States' refugee policy to
international law. By reviewing BIA interpretations of the Act, courts
can ensure that the BIA's interpretations do not depart from the Con-
gressional mandate. Such a process will help remove politics from asy-
lum decisions and move towards the system envisioned by Senator
Kennedy, a system free from territorial and ideological biases. Follow-
ing these recommendations would likely result in more aliens becoming
eligible for asylum. This would force the BIA and the Attorney General
to exercise the discretion granted them by the Refugee Act. The Attor-
ney General and the BIA may, in exercising their discretion, still refuse
to grant asylum to eligible aliens. In such cases, the United States' asy-
lum policy may still not conform to international standards. This
dilemma, however, then would become a problem for Congress and not
the courts. Unless the U.S. changes its course and conforms to its obli-
gations under international law, the U.S. will cease to be the world's
protector of the persecuted.
Epilogue
As this issue went to press, the Supreme Court decided the case of INS
v. Elias-Zacarias,3 0 6 reversing the Ninth Circuit's ruling.3 0 7 Although the
case purports to decide only the narrow question of whether forced mili-
tary service in a guerrilla organization necessarily constitutes "persecu-
tion on account of... political opinion"3 0 8 under the Immigration and
Nationality Act,3 0 9 the case may have a more profound effect. The
Court narrowly construed the words "political opinion," showed broad
deference to the determinations of the BIA, and implicitly raised the
306. No. 90-1342, 1992 WL 6768 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1992).
307. Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990).
308. Elias-Zacarias, 1992 WL 6768, at *1.
309. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (42) (1988).
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standard necessary to be eligible for political asylum. Moreover, the
Court essentially rejected the suggestion made by this Note that the leg-
islative history of the Refugee Act and the international documents
upon which the Act was based should guide interpretation of the
legislation.
The facts of the case can be briefly summarized.310 Jairo Jonathan
Elias-Zacarias, a native of Guatemala, claimed that in January 1987 two
armed, uniformed guerrillas came to his home and asked him and his
parents to join their group. When Zacarias and his parents refused, the
guerrillas told them to think the matter over and that they would return.
Zacarias feared that the government would retaliate if he joined the
rebels, and that the guerrillas would persecute him if he did not join
them. In July 1987, Zacarias fled to the United States, and was later
detained by the INS. The immigration judge handling the deportation
hearing denied Zacarias's request for political asylum on the grounds
that he failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of his political opinions. The BIA dismissed Zacarias's appeal
despite Zacarias's claim that he could adduce new evidence that since his
departure for the United States, the guerrillas had returned twice to his
parents' house in an effort to persuade him to join them. The Ninth
Circuit then reversed the BIA's decision, holding that forced participa-
tion in a guerrilla group necessarily constitutes persecution because it is
"tantamount to kidnapping." 31' Furthermore, such acts of conscription
by guerrilla groups are entitled to the statutory classification of "polit-
ical" persecution because (a) "the person resisting forced recruitment is
expressing a political opinion hostile to the persecutor,"3 1 2 and (b) "the
persecutors' motive in carrying out the kidnapping is political."'313
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit. Justice Scalia, announcing the decision of the Court, refused to
look beyond the words of the statute. In order to fall within the mean-
ing of the words "persecution on account of ... political opinion," the
Court held, an applicant for political asylum must show, first, that he or
she has a firmly held political opinion and, second, that he or she is
persecuted because of that opinion.
Accordingly, even if Zacarias had been able to show that the politi-
cally motivated guerrilla group forced him to join them and would kill or
torture those refusing to join them, underJustice Scalia's reading of the
Refugee Act, Zacarias could not be eligible for political asylum, unless
he could show (a) that he in fact held a firm political opinion and (b) that
it was because of this political opinion that the guerrillas would kill him.
Justice Scalia's interpretation of the words "on account of... polit-
ical opinion" appears to differ from the standard used previously in
most circuits. Courts of appeals have generally considered persecution
310. See Zacarias, 921 F.2d at 847.
311. Id. at 849.
312. Id.
313. Id.
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to be "political" whenever it is politically motivated or when there is a
difference of political opinion between the persecutor and the alien.314
The Court's reading in Elias-Zacarias threatens to eliminate several types
of claims that, until now, provided a basis for political asylum. The doc-
trine of imputed opinion would appear to be in jeopardy. 315 Claims
based on fear of persecution where the potential persecutor is unaware
of political opinions held by the alien might also fail.3 16 It is unclear,
moreover, how the Court would view asylum applications based on a
claim of neutrality.31 7
Justice Scalia found it unnecessary to decide whether Zacarias held
any political opinion, because Zacarias failed to show that he held a well-
founded fear "with the degree of clarity necessary to permit reversal [by
an appellate court] of a BIA finding to the contrary."318
Setting what appears to be a new standard of review of administra-
tive decisions, at least in the area of asylum applications, the Court held
that the BIA's determination that Zacarias was ineligible for asylum must
be upheld if "supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole,"3 19 and can be reversed
only if "the evidence was such that ... a reasonable factfinder would
have to conclude that the requisite fear of persecution existed."3 20
Under the newly announced standard, a circuit court cannot reverse a
BIA decision denying asylum eligibility unless a reasonable factfinder
would necessarily conclude that the alien statisfied the statutory require-
ment. This would appear to be a much higher standard than the sub-
stantial-evidence standard used by most circuits. 321 Even worse for
aliens challenging BIA denials of asylum eligibility, the Court's opinion
blurs the distinction between agency determinations of fact on the one
hand and of questions of law on the other.3 22
It is also likely that the Court has effectively raised the standard of
asylum eligibility. In Cardozo-Fonseca323 the Supreme Court held that
those seeking asylum need only show a reasonable possibility of perse-
314. See supra notes 140-78 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 126-28, 144 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text.
318. Elias-Zacarias, 1992 WL 6768, at *3.
319. Id. at *2 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(4) (1988)).
320. l at *2-3.
321. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 245-65 and accompanying text on the role of the BIA. The
Court makes no attempt to distinguish between factual determinations made by the
BIA and resolutions of legal questions; nor does the Court suggest that the BIA pro-
vide reasons for finding that Zacarias's fear is not well-founded, as the Ninth Circuit
had required. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. Problems may arise if,
as happened in this case, an alien is simply found not to have a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of his or her political opinion. If the BIA summarily rejects
an alien's appeal, an appellate court might be unable to determine whether the alien
failed to present testimony evidencing a well-founded fear or that the alien was ineli-
gible for asylum as a matter of law.
323. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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cution and that a one-in-ten chance of persecution would qualify.3 24 It
would seem that the evidence that Zacarias presented (three visits to his
home in an effort to recruit him), coupled with an advisory letter from
the State Department acknowledging that Guatemalan guerrilla groups
engage in forcible recruitment,3 25 would satisfy a requirement of show-
ing a one-in-ten chance of persecution. Thus, it would appear that the
Supreme Court has in effect backed away from the Cardozo-Fonseca stan-
dard by making it more difficult to reverse BIA denials of asylum
eligibility.
Justice Scalia's approach to statutory construction, relying almost
solely on the strict, literal meaning of the words used in the statute,
would appear to preclude an approach to asylum cases advocated by this
Note. The Court ignored the legislative history, which indicates that the
Refugee Act was intended to codify the United States obligations under
the U.N. Protocol and Convention. 3 26 Furthermore, by focusing solely
on the literal meaning of the statute the Court avoided any need to
examine the U.N. Handbook.3 27
The likely effect of INS v. Elias-Zacarias is to make it much more
difficult for aliens to prove that they are eligible for asylum. As a result
of this decision, an alien, already in the unenviable position of having
left his homeland out of fear of persecution for his beliefs, may now be
forced to return home to face those he fears. Prior to entering the U.S.,
those hoping to obtain asylum may be required somberly to reflect upon
and to decide their political beliefs, announce their views publicly, and
to gather indisputable evidence that some group will certainly persecute
them for their beliefs. This does not reflect the intent of Congress, nor
does it fulfill U.S. obligations under the U.N. Convention, Protocol, or
the U.N. Handbook.
Gregory S. Porter
324. Id. at 440.
325. See Zacarias v. INS, 921 F.2d 844, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1990).
326. See supra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 207-37 and accompanying text.
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